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ABSTRACT
My fascination for marine pollution prevention, liability and compensation has been
motivated by my love for the sea. Among other things, the seas are important to
mankind for two main reasons; they provide a source of food and a means of
transportation. As such, mankind has a duty to protect and preserve the seas and
its living resources from wanton use and destruction. In my search for principles that
may underlie this great conviction, I have found out that these principles are
universal and hereditary as expounded by the following Bible verses:
“... And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.”
Genesis 1: 2
“And God said, “Let the waters bring forth abundantly the
moving creature that hath life. And God created great whales,
and every living creature that moveth, which the waters
brought forth abundantly, after their kind..” Genesis 1: 20-22
“And the Lord God took the man and put him in the Garden of
Eden to work it and take care of it.” Genesis 2: 15

The work strives to bring out the measures that the international community has
taken to protect the marine environment. This is the higher command. One of the
multiplicity of polluting substances, oil, is the focal point of this dissertation. In
particular, the dissertation provides an insight into actions taken by the international
community to mitigate such pollution damage through compensation where
protective and preventive measures have failed. In order to do so, this work
examines in detail the liability regime in international law relating to oil pollution
damage. The law as it stands now is contained in international conventions, which
embody complex and often controversial issues regarding compensating victims
who have suffered such damage.

The limitations and implications of these

measures are also examined.

Key words:

Marine Pollution Prevention,

Compensation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

By the dawn of the 21st century, it is clearly evident that world economic trends have
motivated the need for more energy of which oil is the main source. This period also
marks the era of growing public awareness with respect to the innate value of the
bounties of nature and of the threats that oil poses to it. The conflict that arises from the
growing demands of oil and the rejection of its adverse impact to nature was largely
responsible for the development of international regimes that aim to resolve this issue.
Given the potential damage that oil pollution can cause to the environment,
considerable efforts have been directed to the development of pollution prevention
legislation, as prevention remains the most effective way of fighting oil pollution.

However, prevention is just one way by which problems linked to oil pollution may be
solved. Regardless of the existence of prevention regimes, of improvements in ship
design, construction and equipment, of improved manning requirements, and the
putting into place of safety management systems, pollution accidents are inevitable,
and pollution liability ensues.

The need for developing internationally acceptable liability and compensation regimes
is thus self-evident. With the coming into play of this aspect of the fight against
pollution, shipowners engaged in the transportation of crude oil in bulk as cargo have to
face the consequences of their venture. Humankind’s desire and claim, both now and
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for posterity to live in a decent environment, in which it can enjoy the amenities of
nature, its quest for attaining an acceptable quality of life must be given primary
consideration.
The Torrey Canyon1 incident of March 1967 was to highlight the need for the development
of an international regime that would address and resolve issues relating to liability and
compensation for shipowners and claimants following upon a maritime casualty. Prior to
this incident, oil pollution damage claims were made in accordance with the lex fori, and
these cases were treated according to the rules of ordinary tort law. Given the
international character of shipping and of oil pollution cases as was evident from the
2

Torrey Canyon

incident, the concern for developing a convention framework to regulate

liability and compensation could not be overlooked. It was against this background that
the CLC/FUND regimes were developed.

From its inception, the history of oil international pollution legislation (CLC/FUND) has
remained a history of developing a balance between the conflicting interests of the
parties concerned. For this reason, the solution that must be sought, should be capable
of guaranteeing acceptable levels of fairness and justice to all the parties who for one
reason or another, must invariably be affected following upon a maritime casualty.
Achieving this balance is a difficult task. Any international legislation that is developed
to fulfil this purpose must be able to take into account the interests of the different
claimants, while at the same time, assuring that all liable parties must be treated equally
before the law.

In the light of the preceding remarks, it is clear that oil pollution is undesirable. To avoid
its occurrence, the community of states has elaborated an impressive array of
convention frameworks, which seeks to reduce if not eradicate oil pollution. These are
however not presented in this dissertation.
1

Torrey Canyon Incident (March 1967)

2

Ibid.
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In chapter 2, the writer provides a bird’s eye view of the international liability and
compensation regimes embodied in the Civil Liability Conventions and the International
Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (CLC/FUND) 1969/71 and 1992, developed under
the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

This dissertation traces the origins of certain rules of law that have immensely
influenced the text of the CLC/FUND regimes. As will be realised, reliance was made
on the rules of law existing in the two major legal systems: common law and civil, as
well as some doctrines within the realm of public international law. This writer
subscribes to the view of most scholars who acknowledge the differences in approach
between these two systems. This notwithstanding, strength and inspiration were drawn
from these systems, most especially from the common law system to establish a regime
that is expected to be globally accepted and uniformly applied. It is of course interesting
to know what the consequences of such legal importations are, when the rules of law of
a given legal system are applied to matters before a court, which traditionally does not
subscribe to them. Chapter 3 addresses these concerns.

One of the requirements that the law demands claimants to establish when they
espouse an action for the recovery of damages, is their right to bring action with respect
to that particular claim. A claimant must possess a substantive right to bring a suit for
damages with respect to the alleged loss. This rule is upheld in the CLC/FUND
conventions. Chapter 4 examines this issue, as well as the complex issues that
claimants, most important of all, governments, have to contend with in relation to their
substantive right of action for oil pollution damage to the environment.

The raison d’être of the CLC/FUND regimes is to provide immediate and adequate
compensation to victims of oil pollution damage. That compensation can be
immediately paid to a claimant is a fact that can be easily verified. As such, there is little
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if at all any questions as to whether the regimes fulfil this objective. What is highly
debatable is the allegation of the adequacy of compensation payable. What thresholds
of compensation will meet the requirement of adequacy? It should be borne in mind
that, though the regimes advocate compensability with respect to oil pollution damage,
not all damage suffered following upon a maritime casualty are compensable, at least
for the purposes of the convention. The basis for legal compensation must be
established. It is in the interest of claimants to know what claims are compensable
under the regime.

In addition, situations have been known where claimants have failed to sufficiently
benefit from the liability and compensation regimes due to difficulties connected with the
quantifiability of damage, especially as concerns damage to the environment. These
issues have led this writer to questioning the adequacy of compensation as a remedy in
marine (oil) pollution. An attempt has been made in chapter 5 to address these
problems.

The aspirations of the regimes would not have been met without the necessary financial
security. For this reason, the insurance industry has greatly contributed towards the
success registered in the realm of compensation in oil pollution damage. On the other
hand, the insurance industry would not have provided third party liability coverage had
shipowners not accepted to run the risks of an activity as extra-hazardous as the
transportation of oil.

By providing a regulatory framework for liability and compensation, the CLC/FUND
regimes seek to apportion the liability arising from oil pollution damage among the
shipping (covered by the insurance industry) and oil industries. In chapter 6, the
methods of apportionment of this liability and the drawbacks of the compulsory
insurance regime have been presented.

4

From the summaries of the various chapters of this work, its purpose is evident. Its
main purpose is to demonstrate the level of awareness and the responsiveness that the
international community exhibits in its continuous struggle towards oil pollution
prevention, as well as the steps it will take to mitigate any damage via compensation.
By the same token, this writer questions whether the measures embodied in the
CLC/FUND conventions are sufficient to resolve the problems linked with oil pollution
damage. A comparison between the CLC/FUND regimes and other liability and
compensation regimes would have been a good idea. Unfortunately, such a comparison
falls outside the scope of this work.

5

CHAPTER 2

LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION WITHIN
THE SPECTRUM OF MARINE POLLUTION
Prior to convention law, liability and compensation for oil pollution damage was
governed by the lex causae, that is the domestic law of the place where the damage was
suffered. This was determined under domestic tort law of negligence, trespass or
nuisance. Owing to the great diversity of municipal law regarding liability and
compensation, there was a need to seek some degree of harmonisation of the regime
governing these two related legal concepts.

The main rationale behind the harmonisation of the plethora of municipal law in this
regard, was based on shipping (and oil pollution which is a negative fallout of the
shipping activities), being international in character. As such, all states have a
responsibility vis-à-vis the international community to regulate oil pollution from ships
flying their flags. The need for providing prompt and adequate compensation to oil
pollution victims also motivated the adoption of the Fund Convention of 1971 as an
adjunct to the Civil Liability Convention of 1969.
The Torrey Canyon1 incident of March 1967 highlighted the need for the development of
new international regimes on two very important subjects in both public and private

1

Torrey Canyon incident March 1967

6

international law. These two subjects were not contemplated before. They were related
to;
• The right of a coastal state to intervene on the high seas in the face of an oil pollution
threat; and
• Civil liability and compensation for oil pollution damage (a private law issue to be
considered here.

Private law issues raised after the incident especially with regards to compensation
were legion. The liability of the tanker owner did not raise any doubt, considering that at
the time of an accident the navigation of the ship and the custody of the cargo are in the
charge of the shipmaster. The main questions were those of ascertaining the
jurisdictions and laws that would govern the claims, given that the vessel was;
• flying a Liberian flag
• owned by a company in Bermuda
• managed by principal officers residing in France
• time chartered to a USA domiciled oil company
• sub voyage chartered to a UK oil company
• the pollution damage was suffered principally in the UK.
• substantial pollution damage suffered in France.
Questions with respect to the owners’ right of pleading limitation of liability arose,
considering that different jurisdictions observed different rules of law. The fear that
fishermen and hoteliers could assert their rights to recover damages as granted by
some jurisdictions and rejected by others as pure economic loss owing to its
remoteness was also present. Again, some jurisdictions aligned costs for clean up to
that of pure economic loss and would dismiss such claims. Furthermore, doubts were
expressed on the degree to which such rights as shown above, where granted by
judicial process could be enforced against a company with limited assets. The demerit
of the absence of compulsory insurance could be felt.

7

It was crystal clear that traditional principles or municipal law principles could not
address the private law issues raised above. These diversified rules of law with limited
applicability left a lacuna and hence were insufficient to answer affirmatively the
problems caused by oil pollution damage from ships.

2.1

International Convention on Civil Liability on Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC) 1969

The development of this instrument came about as a global response to the outcry and
condemnation following the Torrey Canyon2 incident, which at that time caused oil
pollution damage on a scale that the world had not hitherto witnessed.

Convening in Brussels in 1969, the International Conference on Maritime Pollution
Damage had the mandate to consider the draft convention on oil pollution damage
alongside other documents. Pre-requisites had been established thanks to the devotion
of IMCO as (IMO was then called) and the Comité Maritime International (CMI). The
committee created at the conference was largely responsible for the examination of the
private law issues raised above. At the end of the day, the CLC ‘69 emerged.

The CLC ’69 was a revolutionary instrument and a major break through in maritime law,
which was to change customs and practice forever. Together with its 1992 Protocol, the
CLC remains the principal international instrument governing and regulating civil liability
for oil pollution from ships caused by persistent oil. The ship should be carrying the
persistent oil in bulk as cargo.

For oil pollution damage to qualify for compensation under the CLC, the damage must
have occurred within the territory or the territorial sea of a member State. This gives the
convention its territory specific quality and limits its geographical application. The
damage, on whose behalf the claim is being made, must be outside the ship. It applies
2

Ibid.
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to damage caused or measures taken following the escape or discharge of oil. It is
based on three cardinal doctrines;
• Strict liability: otherwise referred to as liability without fault. This notion deleted the
age old custom of fault based liability, thereby introducing a novelty on the basis of
liability. This liability is however subject to certain exceptions.
• Limitation of liability: given that the liability of the shipowner is strict, he can
however limit the amount recoverable from him based on the tonnage of his ship.
• Compulsory insurance: the shipowner is obligated to have insurance coverage for
potential liabilities arising under the convention.

2.1.1 Strict Liability
The rule of strict liability, that is liability without fault is clearly enunciated in the 1969
Convention. It provides;
…except as provided in paragraph 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a ship at the time
of an incident, or where the incident consists of a series of occurrences at the time of the
first such occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has
escaped or been discharged from the ship as a result of the incident

3

.

His liability is incurred in so far as he is the owner of the ship responsible for the
pollution damage. Here, the notion of culpa is far fetched.

2.1.2 Limitation of Liability
Under the existing convention (1957 Brussels Limitation Convention), the shipowner
could limit his liability only where he could prove that the incident did not occur as a
result of his actual fault or privity. (This limitation was to the value of 1.000 Poincare’ francs
per ton of the vessel’s adjusted net tonnage.) Though there was a general
3

Civil Liability Convention 1969 Article III(1)
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acknowledgement of the fact that larger amounts of money were necessary to
adequately compensate oil pollution damage, it was also agreed that additional liability
on the shipowner should only be to the tune against which he could reasonably be
expected to pay.

The 1969 Convention raised the level of liability borne by the shipowner to 2.000 francs
per limitation ton, in the case where the pollution did not arise from his actual fault or privity.
Concern was also expressed on how far the shipowner’s limitation of liability could be
stretched to enable him shoulder this additional cost.

2.1.3 Compulsory Insurance
One of the major innovations of the CLC, was the unanimous adoption of a system of
compulsory insurance by tankers trading to contracting states. They are required to
adequately insure their liabilities arising under this convention. A positive fall out of this
requirement is that it saw the involvement of the P& I Clubs in the settlement of claims
arising from oil pollution.

Under this scheme, claimants could initiate direct action against the insurer without the
need of either pursuing the ship in an in rem action, or its owner in an action in personam.
In this way, a claimant faced with a bankrupt owner could resort to direct recourse
against the insurer (P&I Club). The insurer could also limit his liability to the same
amount as the shipowner, and could protect himself from liability by pleading any of the
exceptions available to the shipowner.

In light of these three principles, the first tier compensation scheme was adopted, that is
the CLC 1969 Convention. It was soon to be realised that greater amounts of money
were needed to effectively compensate victims of oil pollution damage, and therefore
the need to step up the level of compensation available to claimants. At the same time,
concern was expressed on how far the shipowner could be reasonably expected to
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meet these new dictates. It was argued that the owner was only one of the parties
connected to the trading and transportation of the good whose hazardous nature was
the potential cause of the damage. Furthermore, it was a way of imposing a legal
responsibility on cargo owners vis -à- vis persons who did not have any interest in the oil
transported, with regard to any liabilities that their cargo could create.

On the strength of these arguments, there was a need to develop a scheme that would
enable the cargo owner to contribute to the compensation awarded to victims of oil
pollution damage. Against this background, the cargo owners (oil importing countries)
were envisaged to fund the second tier of compensation necessary to pay all
supplementary amounts arising from major oil spills and pollution damage.

The second tier goes operational where the claims are over and above the limit of the
first tier compensation recoverable from the shipowner. It further awards compensation
where the liability of the shipowner cannot be engaged.

2.2

The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1971

The 1971 Fund Convention emerged from the Diplomatic Conference convened in
Brussels in 1971 as a follow up action, arising from a resolution taken during the
discussions that led to the CLC Convention of 1969.

As an intergovernmental body, the IOPC Fund was set up under this convention to
administer the contributions made to it by oil receiving states. Under the Fund regime,
no liability is imposed on individual cargo owners. Compensation is payable from the
Fund as indicated above. It therefore represents the statutory contributions of cargo
interests to an oil pollution damage claim. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the
Fund was designed to be closely linked with the CLC. As such, only members of the
CLC can become members of the Fund.
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From its inception, the Fund had the following objectives:
• to provide supplementary compensation to victims of oil pollution damage in member
states where the possibility of obtaining full or adequate compensation under the
CLC is absent or inadequate ; or where the shipowner is financially incapable of
embracing such a responsibility;
• to give some relief to the shipowner in respect of increased financial burden imposed
by the CLC;
• to pay compensation to victims of oil pollution damage where the liability of the
shipowner has not been established.

Some seven years later, the Fund Convention entered into force. With it, the second tier
compensation following oil pollution damage came to be realised. Two Protocols have
amended both the CLC and Fund Conventions. Today, though the two-tier system has
seen wide application, they do not enjoy universal application. Some countries
especially the United States of America opted to go their way by adopting their own
municipal law with respect to oil pollution damage. Thus the CLC and Fund
Conventions cannot be considered customary international law.

2.3

1984 Protocol to the CLC/FUND Conventions

World economic trends in the 1970s were a pointer to the fact that the real value of the
compensation limits prescribed by the 1969 CLC and the 1971 Fund Conventions
would become drastically insufficient to meet oil pollution claims in the face of a major
oil spill. The inflation experienced worldwide had eroded compensation limits to an
unacceptable level.

The implication of this was that, funds originally intended for use in major disasters
supplied by the oil industry, could be used in Fund member states to discharge smaller
claims. As such available compensation would be found wanting to meet the
consequences of a major claim. It threatened the international compensation system to
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its very foundation. The Tanio4 disaster of 1980 was to confirm these pre-occupations. It
further confirmed the trend of thought that a revision of the 69/71 instruments was not
only inevitable but also urgent.

On this premise, an IMO diplomatic conference took place in London in 1984 to discuss
the Protocol that was to amend the 69/71 CLC/Fund Conventions. The need to revise
the limits of compensation was unanimously agreed upon. Difficulties were encountered
while discussing issues such as the figures of the new regime, the apportionment of
financial burden between the shipping and oil industries in cases concerning small
tankers and the upper limits of the compensation under the regime. On the mistaken
belief that the USA would ratify the protocol, the delegates to the conference made
major compromises.
Thanks to the Exxon Valdez5 incident of 1989, this was never to be the case. The USA
opted for its own law, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). With this, the 1984
Protocol failed to obtain the requisite number of ratifications. It never entered into force,
and eventually became defunct.

2.4

1992 Protocols to the CLC/FUND Conventions

A month following the entry into force of OPA 1990, CLC/Fund member States were
stunned by the casualty involving the Haven6, a tanker laden with 144.000 tons of crude
oil, while at anchor in Genoa. Some of its cargo escaped into the sea causing extensive
damage to the French and Italian Rivieras. The claims that ensued represented the
largest claims ever presented to the CLC/Fund Conventions. They far exceeded the
total compensation available under this scheme.

4

The Tanio incident 1980
Exxon Valdez incident 1989
6
The Haven Italy 1991
5
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Following this incident, the importance and urgency of giving effect to the protocols
revising the 69/71 instruments became too obvious. There was a perceived need to
augment limits of compensation to match contemporary realities. There was a need to
maintain the viability of the international system. The IMO again convened a diplomatic
conference in London in 1992. It was mandated to develope protocols that would suit
the purposes of existing and potential members of the CLC/Fund Conventions. This
was achieved by reaching a compromise involving contributions to the Fund, which, it
was agreed should not be prejudicial to the oil industry of major contributors such as
Japan.
The compromise led to the 1992 Protocols7. Entry into force requirements is less
cumbersome as compared to those of 1984. In 1996, the 1992 regime entered into
force. The CLC/FUND of 1992 maintained the three pillars of the 1969/71 liability and
compensation regimes; strict liability, limitation of liability and compulsory insurance.
Changes brought in by the 1992 Protocols could be summarised as follows;
•

scope of application extended to cover oil pollution damage caused in the EEZ or
equivalent area of a state party,

•

covers claims with respect to measures actually undertaken or to be undertaken to
reinstate the contaminated environment;

•

expenses incurred for successful preventive measures in the face of imminent
threat of pollution damage;

•

covers spills from bunker from unladen tankers in certain circumstances ;

•

increased limit of shipowner liability, ranging from three (3) million SDR to 59.7
million SDR according to ship tonnage;

•

shipowner’s right to limit liability more stringent, that is if he can prove that the
pollution damage resulted not from his personal fault or omission, committed with
intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage
would probably result.

7

The Protocols are referred to as the CLC 92 and the Fund 92 Convention
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Though not all members of the 1969/1971 Conventions have ratified the 1992
Protocols, there is reason to believe that it would sooner be realised that the merits of
the latter instruments out number those of the former. Upon this realisation, the 1969/71
instruments will eventually phase out. Until this eventually happens, the two regimes
exist side by side and are managed separately though by the same board.

15

CHAPTER 3

THE CIVIL LIABILITY AND THE FUND CONVENTIONS
1969/71 AND 1992
The reason for the development of an international liability and compensation scheme
known as the CLC/Fund regime has been provided in Chapter 2. It was also
demonstrated in that chapter that compensation for oil pollution damage arising from a
maritime casualty is a relatively new concern, introduced into maritime law by a regime
which has gained the reputation of being very ambitious and revolutionary. Most of the
laws in this field were developed after the upsurge in the use of large tankers in the
1960s and the spate of tanker casualties that followed at that same period.

With these facts in mind, it would be of interest to know how the principles of law that
make up the CLC/FUND package were developed. What principles of law, what legal
systems influenced the development of these regimes are examined in 3.1 “Historical
Development”. Reference will be made to some decided cases to demonstrate how oil
pollution damage cases were treated before convention law, and how the CLC/FUND
regimes were developed. The writer will make reference to certain rules of both public
international law and private law to show how they helped in shaping this branch of
maritime law in what has been captioned "Legal Importation".

The consequences and implications of these “legal importations” on states whose
domestic laws are not guided by such rules as in those legal systems from which
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principles have been imported will be examined in 3.2 “Consequences and Implications
of Legal Importations”. An analysis will be made with respect to a few of the provisions
of the convention that may merit attention when possible amendments are
contemplated in 3.3.
Such is the purport of chapter 3.

3.1

Historical Development

As mentioned in chapter 2 above, prior to convention law, the law that governed claims
for oil pollution damage from ships was that relating to all other claims in tort against the
ship or its owner. In other words, liability for oil pollution damage, just like that arising
from other marine accidents, was grounded mainly on common law torts of trespass,
negligence or nuisance theories. Although it had been recognised as far back as 1926
and 1936 that damage of this nature required an international solution, the only state
that provided an exception to this rule was the United States of America, which in 1924
developed the Oil Pollution Act. This piece of legislation imposed specific liability on
ships for the discharge of oil in the navigable waters of the United States.

It should be borne in mind that at this time, world trade in terms of tonnage of oil
transported by sea was not very large, given that tanker sizes were kept within modest
limits. The average ships had a dead-weight (dwt) of 11.600 tons gross1. Furthermore,
shipowners were under no statutory obligation of removing oil that escaped from their
ships resulting from either normal ship operation or from a maritime casualty. Public
authorities that incurred expenses from clean up operations could recover
compensation only upon their ability to prove tort liability on the part of the shipowner
who again, had the possibility of limiting his liability under maritime law.

1

Colin De La Rue, (1998), Shipping and the Environment. p.10
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An examination of the land mark Esso Petroleum case2 tried in the United Kingdom (UK)
relating to attempts at recovering costs incurred in removing oil from the shoreline will
be helpful in demonstrating the pre- convention situation.

The facts of this case are as follows. In December 1950, the motor tanker The Inverpool
set sail for Preston on the West Coast of England from Liverpool. Due to bad weather
and a steering defect, she ran aground somewhere in the Ribble Estuary. She could not
refloat on her own and the threat of breaking up became very real. To forestall this, her
master jettisoned 400 tons of the oil she was carrying. The local authorities then
brought an action against the owners of The Inverpool, the Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd in a
bid to recover the cost of the removing oil from the adjacent shoreline. These claims
were brought in negligence, trespass and nuisance.

The action based on negligence failed because the three factors necessary to establish
a claim in negligence were not satisfied; a legal duty to take care, a breach of that duty,
and a consequential loss arising from that breach. The plaintiff failed to prove the
existence of the legal duty to take care as established in Lord Aikin’s celebrated obiter
dictum

in Donoghue v. Stevenson3.

Trespass would entail an illegal interference with a person’s right to enjoy their property.
This was ruled out in the Esso Petroleum4 case, as the high court found that the plaintiffs
had failed to prove any tortuous liability on the part of the shipowners, given that the
claimants had no property in the sea or the polluted coastline. The House of Lords
upheld the decision of the appellate jurisdiction on the same grounds.

Relating to nuisance, it could be either public or private. It is defined as public nuisance
“any nuisance which materially affected the reasonable comfort and convenience of

2

Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Southport Corporation, [1955] 2 Lloyds Rep.655
Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C.562 p.580
4
Op.cit.
3
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life…”5 Nuisance could not be successfully proved in the case under consideration.
Added to this, the owners of The Inverpool were under no statutory obligation to clean up
oil that escape from their ships. Grounds for action thus provided by the law of tort,
themselves subject to a number of defences, proved inadequate to right the wrongs
suffered by oil pollution victims. Though the ruling in this case went by almost unnoticed outside legal circles, it was later on to play an immense role in the development
of the law regarding oil pollution damage.

Events in world history such as the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 and developments in ship
design and building techniques were to oblige shipyards to build tankers of
unprecedented sizes. Tankers’ carrying capacities increased. The attending risks of
damage from oil pollution in the event of a tanker casualty were not only higher, but
such a damage if and when it did occur, was to be of a phenomenal scale.

It was only a matter of time before one such super tanker would unleash its contents to
cause pollution on a scale unknown before. This school of thought recognised that an
incident of this magnitude would provide the platform for an international demand for
uniform liability and compensation schemes. The Torrey Canyon incident of 1967 was to
provide that platform.
The Torrey Canyon was a Liberian tanker (one of the largest at that time) 6 which, while
transporting a cargo of 120.000 tons of crude oil from Kuwait destined for Wales, struck
the Pollard Rock on the Seven Stones Reef, between Land’s End and the Isles of Scilly.
Thousands of tons of oil escaped from her ruptured tanks. The apparent fear of wide
scale oil pollution became real, and the damage occasioned by this casualty spread
beyond the boundaries of one country. It highlighted the need for the development of
new international regimes in both private and public law, as discussed in above.

5
6

Attorney-General v. P.Y.A Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 W.L.R. 770, C.A
Colin De La Rue (1998) Shipping and The Environment p. 11
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The community of states realised the international character of oil spill and the
seriousness of the damage that ensued. There was unanimity with regard to the need
for formulating universal rules to govern liability and compensation. Nonetheless, the
timing between the fast growth of technology and the spate of tanker casualties had the
negative effect that international law had little time to receive and develop applicable
general principles. The main hurdle was that of determining what legal system and what
principles of law would influence these regimes. Reliance had to be made on “ legal
importations ” in order to develop the regimes that were to satisfy this growing demand.

3.1.1 Legal Importation

Inspiration was to be drawn from other aspects of the relation between states that is,
public international law, as well as from other well developed principles of private law.
This marked the legal importation from public international law and private law into this
branch of the law.

3.1.1.1

Doctrine of State Responsibility

The doctrine of state responsibility, an established doctrine recognised in public
international law, played a leading role in the formulation of most marine pollution
prevention regimes as well as the CLC/FUND Conventions. By this doctrine,
international law imposes a responsibility on every state to ensure that its territory is not
used in such a way as to cause damage to other states or citizens thereof.

Where the state fails to assume this responsibility, such a state will be bound by
international law to pay compensation to affected persons. It is the duty of states to
regulate activities under their control so that they do not cause harm to other states.
This doctrine was used in the Trail Smelter Arbitration7 between the United States of
America and Canada, whose facts are as follows.
7

Trail of Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.i.A.A.,iii,p. 1905. Decision March 11 1941
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Fumes from a smelter in Trail British Colombia close to the border with the United
States had drifted across the border, causing harm to persons in US territory. In an
action brought by the US government on behalf of its citizens, the tribunal declared that…under the principles of international law…no state has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or property or
persons therein….

8

This declaration and duty has been stretched to cover not only injury by fumes, but also
includes the states' duty to prevent persons under their jurisdictions, as well as ships
and other floating devices attributable to them from polluting other states' jurisdictional
waters. This rule was reiterated in the Corfu Channel case9. The facts are as follows.

Albania had always disputed the status of the North Corfu Channel as an international
strait, and would rather consider it as forming part of its territorial sea. Owing to
skirmishes which British warships had been subjected, a test passage was again
organised by the UK government in October 1946 to see Albania's reaction. The ships
struck recently laid mines, resulting in the death of some crew members. In finding for
the UK government, the court held among other justifications that, though the mines
may have been laid without the direct orders of the Albanian government, they could
not have been laid without it being unaware of it. Albania, under international law, is not
to allow her territory to be used in a way that is contrary to the interests of other states.
A breach of this duty incurs liability.

The nexus between this rule of international law and the CLC/FUND is indeed quite
conspicuous. While the former has been clearly stated, the latter imposes a liability on
the state, acting either in its capacity as a shipowner (maritime state) or as cargo owner
(oil industry) under the Fund convention for oil pollution damage. In this way, a public
8
9

Brian D. Smith (1988). State Responsibility And The Marine Environment p. 73
Corfu Channel Case [1949] I.C.J. Reports, p.4
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law doctrine is employed in private law, in resolving issues with purely private law
undertones. Conversely, Trail Smelter and other cases tried after it, exemplify the hybrid
notion of states litigating as private entities within the domain of public international law.
States use doctrines elaborated under public international law to enforce the legal rights
of their citizens, acting as a private entity. This marks a fusion between public
international law and private law.

3.1.1.2

State Responsibility for Vessels Arising out of
Convention law: (United Nations Law of the Sea convention
1982)

Though developed subsequent to the CLC/FUND (1969/1971) regimes, this umbrella
convention lays down, among other things, the blue print for marine environmental
protection. It prescribes the duties of states, as well as the consequences of violating
what could be rightly termed principles of customary international law. It empowers a
state by prescription and enforcement, to totally control the physical condition,
movement and operations of vessels that fly its flag. Hence, such a state has the
utmost jurisdiction for prescribing design, construction, equipment and manning
standards that must be met by all vessels under its registration10. States are further
required to adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of
marine pollution from ships flying their flags.

Exercising the same authority, the state must take measures to ensure that the master,
the officers and the crew are conversant with and required to observe applicable
international regulations relating to safety of life at sea and the prevention and control of
marine pollution.

10

United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 1982 Article 94 (3)
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UNCLOS is very categorical on this as it provides that "states have the obligation to
protect and preserve the marine environment"11. From these, it can be deduced that
each state has the obligation to prevent harm to the its own marine environment, its
EEZ and its territorial sea as well as those of other states and of the high seas beyond
such zones.

It is only logical that when a state assumes legal authority over a vessel through
registration, it should complement such authority by assuming certain obligations. It
should take measures to ensure that the vessel acts in a manner compatible with the
dictates of international law. A state's obligation can therefore be translated into a duty
to exercise the full measure of its territorial and extraterritorial legal authority to prevent
marine pollution. Its international responsibility will arise out of a failure to adequately
exercise this "fictional" authority to prevent this violation. Its responsibility under
international law will be triggered when this obligation imposed by a norm-creating
convention law is breached.

3.1.1.3

Importation from the Common Law System

As one of the major legal systems, the English Common Law was instrumental in
shaping the liability and compensation schemes established under the CLC/FUND
regimes. This was true not only with respect to the spirit of the law as it existed in the
UK at that time, but also with certain rules of law that were brought and applied to a
system that was to achieve international recognition and application.

3.1.1.3.1 Doctrine of Actual Fault or Privity
In their original version, the CLC/FUND conventions relied heavily on the spirit of the
wordings of existing English legislation. This can be seen in the provisions relating to
the shipowner's right to limit his liability when faced with maritime claims. Under the

11

Ibid. Article 192
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English regime12, the shipowner lost his right to limit his liability where the damage
occurred due to his actual fault or privity. CLC 196913 also upholds a nexus between the
loss of the right to limit liability and the owner’s responsibility where it is proved that the
damage occurred due to the actual fault or privity of the shipowner. The actual fault or privity
doctrine could also be traced to the 1957 Limitation Convention as well.

The dictates of this principle provide that, the shipowner will be unable to plead his right
to limit such liability, if it is shown that he was actually at fault or was privy to the cause
of the damage. It is not necessary to prove that the owner was actually at fault but
causal link between the fault and the damage must be established and proved.

3.1.1.3.2 The Rule of Strict Liability
The rule of strict liability was developed under the common law system. In essence, it is
a rule that imposes liability on any person who for his own purposes, indulges in an
activity hazardous by its very nature, that it will "do mischief" by causing damage if it
escapes. This rule was established in the classic case of Rylands v. Fletcher14.

In this case, independent contractors who were mill owners constructed a reservoir on
the land of the defendants. Eventually, water flooded into a shaft of an unused coalmine
causing damage to it. In deciding in favour of the plaintiff in an action to recover
damages against the defendant, the Exchequer Chamber highlighted the following
points which today form the basis of the rule of strict liability;
•

bringing to land, collecting and keeping for one’s own purpose something out of its
natural habitat, or something which is naturally not there;

•

likelihood of causing "mischief" damage if that something escapes;

•

escape of that something;

12

Merchant Shipping Act 1894, Section 503

13

Civil Liability Convention 1969, Article V para.2
Rylands v. Fletcher [1868], L.R.3 H.L 330, [18868], L.R Ex.265 pp.270-280
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•

causes damage as a natural consequence of its escape.

As mentioned above, this rule contributed greatly to the elaboration of the liability and
compensation regimes under examination. Generally, an oil spill will answer
affirmatively to the criteria established above.
Viewed from another perspective, a difficulty will be encountered if a strict application of
the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher15 were to be made to an oil spill. The rule relates to the use
of land. Justice Blackburn states…we think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his
own purposes brings on land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his
peril and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the
16

damage of its escape .

Oil spills on the other hand occur at sea and not on land. Could this then eliminate the
applicability of this rule, given that all of the criteria have not been met? This does not fit
in with the rational of the Rylands v. Fletcher rule. It is worth mentioning that, the rule
established in this case, stands for the proposition that there is strict liability where the
activity that caused the damage is of an extra hazardous character. It is the quality of
the activity that seems to be of essence and not the place in which the said activity is
being carried out. The extra hazardous nature of an activity will exist whether that
activity is carried on land or at sea. Strict liability will flow where damage is caused. The
damage could arise from collecting huge quantities of water on land as in the case, or
from transporting huge quantities of oil by sea. Be it as it may, the defendant will be
strictly liable once it is established that his activity was of an extra hazardous nature.

15
16

Ibid.
Rylands v. Fletcher [1868], L.R 1 Ex. 265 pp.270-280
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Furthermore, it could be argued that, under principles of public international law a ship
is considered as part of the territory of the state whose flag it flies. It is considered as a
floating island of the flag state17. Hence, rules of law that are applicable to the landmass
are in the same way, applicable to the floating island. The jurisdiction of the flag state
can be described as "quasi territorial". Consequently, an oil spill from a ship, is an
"escape" which if it causes damage to another state could be considered as using the
ship, i.e., "territory" in such a way as to cause damage to another state or person.

3.2

Implementation of International Conventions:
Consequences and Implications of Legal Importation

From the preceding discussion, it can be inferred with a high degree of certainty that the
English common law was very instrumental in the moulding and shaping of the
CLC/FUND regimes. The consequences and implications of implementing these
importations into the domain of state practice within the framework of government
implementation, compliance and enforcement of international conventions cannot be
ignored.

3.2.1 Consequences of Implementing International Conventions (Legal
Importation): The case of the CLC/FUND
As a matter of principle, international conventions are applicable to states, as opposed
to national legislation, which is applicable to the citizenry. It follows from this that only
states can become parties thereto by either ratifying or acceding to them. By whatever
means a state chooses to become a party to an international convention (ratification,
accession), the legal consequences are legion. These include, inter alia-

17

S.S Lotus case (France v. Turkey), [1927] PCIJ ser. A.,no. 10
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•

The state party is bound by the provisions of that convention. It undertakes a duty
under public international law, and dons a mantle of responsibilities and obligations
arising out of that convention.

•

It is obliged to implement that convention by incorporating it within its corpus of
municipal law, thus giving it legal effect.

•

It is subject to the convention with respect to other contracting states, even if it fails
to implement the convention.

•

It cannot enforce the provisions of the convention against any contravening state
where it fails to give it legal effect, since the convention has not become part of the
law of the land.

•

On the other hand, by giving legal effect to the convention, the state party
empowers itself and its citizenry to benefit insofar as concerns the application of the
said convention within its jurisdiction.

Against this background therefore, the implementation of a convention to which a state
has become a party is very essential if the provisions of the convention are to make any
meaningful contributions to the economic life of the state concerned. To give it a normcreating character, it is important that the implementation and effect of the international
convention within a national legal order be governed by either its domestic
constitutional law, or by any other law which is both superior and of general application
in the land.

3.2.2 Implications of Implementing (Legal Importation) the CLC/FUND
Conventions.

The impact of the legal importation dealt with above, will be examined alongside the two
major legal systems in contemporary times, these being the common and civil law
systems. Far apart from the differences that arise from their respective historical
beginnings, these systems demonstrate marked differences from the standpoints of
legal reasoning and rules of procedure.
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3.2.2.1

Common Law System

The common law system has been defined as, "the group of legal systems founded
mainly on the common law of England"18. It has been defined as judge made law or as
case law. Unlike its civil law counterpart, the existent of legislative law is intended to
provide guidance to the tribunals. There is the noticeable absence of the strict
application of legislative law, as it is intended to give guidance to judges who can
interpret the law to suit the matter before the court. The starting point of legal reasoning
in this system is always around the interpretation and applicability of earlier judicial
decisions, most important of all being decisions rendered by courts of superior
jurisdiction such as the House of Lords. The applicable law is derived from the
decisions of courts.

Faced with such a situation, the tribunal is compelled to formulate and apply a legal
norm, of character enough to resolve the dispute between conflicting parties. Decisions
thus arrived at by the courts of highest jurisdiction are binding upon subordinate courts
which adhere to such case law. This is referred to as the doctrine of stare decisis.
However, a court is under no obligation to follow its own precedents. It may elect to
follow a case law rule, which it had laid down earlier. In the same way, a case law rule
established by a court is not binding on a court of parallel or higher jurisdiction.

A positive fall out of this system is that, a greater level of flexibility is awarded judges
with respect to the various views of the judicial role in dealing with case law. Under this
system, courts have greater liberties in dealing with issues than their counterparts in the
civil law system. Some states that have adopted the common law system besides the
UK are Canada (without Quebec), New Zealand, Australia, India and the USA.

18

D. Walker., the Oxford companion to Law.
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3.2.2.2

Civil Law System

The civil law system is,
…the general term for the group of legal systems which developed
mainly in Western Europe from the ruins of the Western Roman
Empire and in which concepts and principles drawn from Roman
law have powerful influence.

19

Within these circles as opposed to those of common law, the starting point of legal
reasoning is more often than not a provision in the statute or code. Very little regard is
placed on judicial precedence.
A code will represent a systematic compilation of related enactments normally
specifying most crimes and the procedure for prosecuting them. Under this system, a
rule of legislative act is cast in an authoritative textual form, from which the judge
cannot depart except where such a rule is unconstitutional. A judge cannot exercise the
flexibility to ignore or supplant a rule even if to his belief, such a rule is unreasonable.

Rules of procedure are remarkably different within this system from those under the
common law system. Judges play an active role in the examination of witnesses as well
as in the conduct of the proceedings. Hence the role of counsel is immensely reduced.
The reverse is true with the common law system. Due to these factors, the civil law
system is referred to as inquisitorial as against the adversarial nature of common law
proceedings.

Given the marked differences between these two major systems, it would be of interest
to know how rules of law of the one system work when imported into the other via
international conventions. All conventions are to be internationally applied. How the
picking and choosing impacts the legal environment within these respective systems
and how the judicial machinery in each system has adapted to these variances, is
presented below.

19

Ibid.
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3.2.2.3

Implications of the Legal Importation within the CLC/FUND
Regimes

When a state elects to ratify or accede to an international convention, it finds itself
under the obligation to incorporate it into the corpus of its domestic law for the reasons
stated above. A convention is always cast in a textual form. As such, (the case of the
CLC/FUND) it is considered as a legislative act in its broader sense, since the intended
effect of that convention is that of adding to or altering the law.20
A state which has adopted the common law system (conspicuous absence of legislative
act), and which ratifies or accedes to the CLC/FUND Conventions, finds itself under the
obligation of introducing into its body of municipal law, a law cast in a textual form,
identifiable with the civil law system. The direct implication of this is that the judicial
landscape of a predominantly case law system is altered. It is now infringed by
methods, which hitherto were unknown.

It had been demonstrated earlier on how the rule of strict liability developed and
established in the Ryland v. Fletcher21 case was introduced into the CLC/FUND regimes.
This rule owed its survival not to a legislative act, but to the doctrine of binding
precedence. By ratifying and incorporating the CLC/FUND Conventions into their
municipal law, and applying the provisions of these conventions within their
jurisdictions, states that have adopted the civil law system introduce into their system
an uncodified rule established and upheld by judicial precedence. Judging by the
standards of the proponents of the civil law system, the authority generated by judicial
precedence is not greater than that of legal scholars and therefore falls short of
constituting a law.

It is evident that the requirement of implementing international conventions irrespective
of the process involved has tremendously altered states' customs and practices insofar
20

B.O. Okeke 2 (1981) The Techniques of International Maritime Legislation I.C.L.Q.,vol 30 p.513,515
21 Rylands v. Fletcher [1868], 1.R.3 H.L 330, [1868] L.R 1 Ex.265pp.270-280
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as their adoption and adaptation are concerned. The marked difference between the
two legal systems in terms of the starting point of legal reasoning has somehow been
downplayed.

It is not surprising that today legislative acts can be seen playing an increasingly
dominant role in the development of principles of law in the common law jurisdictions.
Conversely, courts of civil law jurisdictions are seen to be increasingly following and
applying prior judicial decisions. This has played favourably with respect to international
conventions, (especially as concerns the CLC/FUND Conventions) as it has instilled in
them a high degree of respectability as well as uniformity in application.

3.2.2.4

Applicability of the CLC/FUND Conventions

The CLC/FUND Conventions like all other international conventions are not applicable
to non-contracting states. An oil pollution damage that occurs within the territorial sea or
EEZ (location of damage) of a non-contracting state will not be compensated by the
instruments. In the same way, the instruments will not be applicable to an oil spill that
occurs within the territorial sea or EEZ of a non-contracting state (location of incident)
even if the same incident led to pollution damage in a state, which is a contracting party
to the conventions.

It should be recalled that the raison d'être for the creation of the CLC/FUND regimes is of
providing immediate and adequate compensation to victims of oil pollution damage
following a maritime casualty insofar as such victims are private or public persons within
contracting states. The driving force has been getting both the shipping and oil
industries to contribute to IMO's efforts towards protecting and preserving the marine
environment. Certain provisions within the text of the conventions have prompted this
writer to make the following analysis.
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The wordings of the 1969/71 and 1992 conventions specifically spell out the
geographical scope of application of the conventions, as within the territorial sea of
contracting states.22 The revised version extends the ambit of application to embrace
the EEZ of contracting states23a concept created by UNCLOS 1982.24

The catching words within this context are, within the territory not beyond the territorial
sea, the exclusive economic zone and contracting states. These denote the areas in
favour of which the benefits of the regimes can be construed. It would not be wrong to
contend from these that the regimes are "territory specific" in nature, in terms of location
of damage. In this connection therefore, no one would expect the CLC/FUND regimes,
be it in their original or revised versions, to be applicable to oil pollution damage within a
non-contracting state.

Applied in the reverse, it would be expected that immediate and adequate
compensation would be available to any contracting state that suffers oil pollution
damage upon a maritime casualty irrespective of the location of the incident, where it is
clear that the requirements of the articles cited in the footnote have been met with. The
advantage of this is that a close knit relationship between such potential victims and the
instruments will be created. On the other hand, some shortcomings that merit attention
can be identified upon a close examination of the text of the conventions.

Firstly, the general rule is to the effect that for oil pollution damage to be covered under
the conventions, the damage should be within the territorial sea for '69/ '71 states, and
as far as the EEZ for the '92 states. On the other hand, a contracting state which suffers
oil pollution damage within the areas prescribed above from an incident occurring within
a non-contracting state, but from which same incident oil drifts and causes the said
damage will not be covered. The fact that the ship involved in the casualty from which
the oil escaped and caused the damage is registered under a contracting state does not
22

Civil Liability Convention 1969, Article II, Fund Convention 1971 Article 3
Civil Liability Convention 1992, Article 3, Fund Convention 1992 Article 4
24
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 1982, Article 55
23
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alter the position.25 This leaves this writer with the impression that focus has been
shifted from the “territory specificity” in terms of location of damage, to “territory
specificity” in terms of location of incident.

For all intents and purposes, what the conventions seek to address by providing
remedial action via the mechanisms of liability and compensation, are the protection
and preservation of marine fauna and flora and of property. Therefore, it is logical
thinking to expect that such remedy should be made available to a contracting party
suffering from that which the convention seeks to prevent once convention law has
been satisfied. The provenance of the oil should not be a determining factor.

Furthermore, provision is made within the convention for re-imbursement of expenses
incurred with respect to reasonable preventive measures26, which have the primary
objective of preventing or minimising pollution damage that may occur within the
territorial sea or EEZ of contracting states. Again reasonable preventive measures
could be taken by anybody whose interests are threatened by the spill. Infact, the
convention does not limit action to be taken to a specified group or groups of persons.

Construed in this manner, a contracting state would be entitled to compensation under
the notions of reasonable preventive measures, even if the damage is not yet real. The
damage is yet to be suffered. Relating to reasonable preventive measures, the origin of
the oil does not appear to be of importance. The rule relating to “territory specificity”
(location of incident and location of damage) appears to apply differently when it comes
to reasonable preventive measures. It obviously applies in favour of the location of the
incident, as opposed to the dictates of the conventions.
Convention provisions are drawn to favour more the prevention of damage than to
reversing the negative impact of the oil pollution damage. Better coverage is awarded
the threat than the actual damage. Maybe the fact that lower amounts are payable
25

Colin De La Rue (1998). Shipping and the Environment p. 77

26

CLC 1969 Article 1, Fund 71 Article 1, CLC 1992Article II, Fund 92 Article 1
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under the regime for reasonable preventive measures than for actual oil pollution
damage is accountable for this tendency.
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CHAPTER 4

ACTIONABILITY IN MARINE POLLUTION
It has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters that under the CLC/FUND ‘69/71
and ‘92 regimes, a shipowner would be strictly liable for oil pollution damage to property
and the environment caused by oil that escapes from or is discharged by his ship. Thus,
the protection of the environment is not solely governed by the realm of public and
administrative law arising out of the doctrine of state responsibility, which are mostly
preventative in nature. Rules of private law (especially that of strict liability) which are
compensatory in nature have tremendously contributed to the development of
environmental protection regimes.
While the liability of the shipowner and the cargo owner under the regimes has been
limited to insignificant if at all any debate, in many cases, there has been a lot of debate
as to whether a particular claimant or group of claimants possesses a substantive right
to bring suit for damages arising from an oil spill. Furthermore, not all losses suffered in
connection with an oil spill are compensable under the regimes.

The possibility of recovering compensation under the regimes does not operate
in isolation. It is subject to recognised principles of law. What legal quality should
a claimant possess to enable him recover damages under the regimes? Is the
possession of the required

locus standi

a pre-requisite and a guarantee to a

successful claim? An attempt is made in chapter 4 to address these issues.
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4.1

The Notion of Actionability

Actionability within this context refers to the quality of the claimant in bringing an action
for compensation for oil pollution damage. The fact that a damage or a loss has been
caused following an oil spill does not necessarily entitle everyone who may have been
adversely affected by the spill to bring an action for compensation. To have quality to
sue for compensation, the claimant must prove a substantive right to bring suit in
relation to the damage suffered generally referred to as locus standi.

4.1.1 The Notion of Locus Standi
In many legal systems, the law demands that the person claiming compensation on
behalf of a loss must have a particular type of interest such as ownership, possession
or control of the subject matter of the claim in order to claim the loss. This is known as
locus standi

or standing, and is inherent to the claimant, arising from his proprietary

interest in the property damaged. Thus locus standi is different from jurisdiction; the latter
being the power of the court to entertain the matter. Within common law jurisdictions,
the right of action is vested only on those who are directly harmed by the damage. This
will mean that the right of action would lie on the individual possessing the property,
which suffers the damage. In this connection, the litigant should be able to prove two
things;
• possession of the damaged property;
• proprietary interest in the property.
It is only when these factors are established that the claimant can be heard to contend
that he has the standing to bring an action with respect to the damaged property or
environment. In fact, the idea that there exists a possibility of bringing an action on
behalf of marine fauna and flora without establishing the above factors would seem
strange.
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The question of locus standi has often been raised with respect to actions brought by
either a State, a community and even an individual in connection to environmental
damage, as well as to the living resources that abound within the territorial sea and
internal waters of an affected area.

4.1.1.1

Locus Standi: The Position of a State

As mentioned above, locus standi denotes the possession of a substantive right to bring
an action with respect to the wrong done or a loss or damage suffered. Such standing
can be demonstrated where the claimant can prove ownership, possession and control
of the res in respect of which the compensation is sought. The claimant must be able to
prove not only the existence of a proprietary interest in the damaged property, but also
that such an interest has been detrimentally affected by the oil spill.

Following established principles of public international law, a state has exclusive
sovereignty over its landed territory, its internal waters and its territorial sea.1 The
exercise of this sovereignty is recognised as an absolute manifestation of state power
over its citizens, its resources and even other citizens found within such areas. The
state is granted the power to conserve the living resources of the sea (territorial sea)
and to preserve the coastal environment.2 A state will have an interest in protecting
such properties, which belong to no one in particular, by relying on the notion of
common ownership of certain resources. This connotes that the state has a proprietary
interest over such areas and resources.

An undue interference which may come by way of an oil spill, with the wetlands,
beaches, tidal marshes and the development of such areas or aquatic life, will
constitute an injury to the state property even though such property may belong to the
public at large.

1
2

United Nations Law of the Sea Convention : Article 2
United Nation Law of the Sea Convention: Article 21 (d), (f)
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Traditional legal theory would describe a state’s interest in such areas and resources as
direct ownership. In the McCready case3, the court’s opinion was clearly stated in the
following declaration;
...each State owns the beds of all tide-waters within its jurisdiction unless they have
been granted away...in the like manner, the State owns the tide waters themselves, and
the fish in them so far as they are capable of ownership while running. For this purpose
the State represents its people and the ownership is that of the people in their united
sovereign.

This notion of the proprietary interest of the state over the marine environment was
buttressed in another court decision where the learned judges with Frankfurter. J
concurring remarked as follows;
...a State may care for its own in utilising the bounties of nature within her borders
because it has technical ownership of such bounties or, when ownership is in no one,
because the State may for common good, exercise all the authority that technical
4

ownership confers.

In the celebrated case of the

5

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. m/v Zoe Colocotroni

, the

question of locus standi of a state was again presented. In March 1973, the
Zoe Colocotroni

m/v.

ran aground on a reef off the coast of Puerto Rico. During refloating

operations, more than 5.000 tons of crude oil was released which finally came to
rest on the South- Western tip of the Bahia Sucia Bay. The Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico and the Commonwealth Environmental Quality Board filed claims
for damages to the marine environment. Two legal issues were raised in this
claim;
• the plaintiff’s standing (locus standi) to sue for economic loss of its own property, and
• the plaintiff’s capacity as parens patriae to initiate an action for damages as trustee of
the public trust in the resources. This will be examined below.

3
4
5

McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S 391,394 (1876)
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 US385, 1948 A.M.C 1098 (1948)
628F. 2d 652 (1st Cir.1980)
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Referring to the first issue, the Court of Appeal upheld the plaintiff’s standing to sue for
economic loss to its own property. The defendant shipowner and P&I Clubs did not
contest this position. Judicial decisions6 and enacted legislation7 in certain common law
jurisdictions notably the USA are legion in support of the fact that a state can directly or
technically lay claim of ownership of marine wildlife as well as the organisms that
abound within that ecosystem.

Against this background, it can be answered in the affirmative that a state has a
substantive right of action and may sue in its proprietary capacity to recover
compensation for oil pollution damage to state property beneath inland waters,
beaches, wetlands and living resources. State interest is evidenced by its ownership of
the environment and therefore of its living and non- living resources. This position has
been recognised and upheld by the IOPC Fund in The Haven8 albeit not expressly. The
facts of this case are as follows.

The Haven was a Cypriot tanker laden with a cargo of 144.000 tons of crude oil that
caught fire whilst at anchor off Genoa. The fire led to a series of explosions resulting in
the release of some of the oil into the sea. This caused extensive pollution damage to
the Italian and French Rivieras. In addition to the many claims that were presented to
the IOPC Fund for property damage and or financial loss, the Italian government
pursued a claim with respect to damage to the environment.

It is interesting to point out that what the defendants (IOPC Fund and the P&I Club)
challenged in this matter, was the methods of assessment and quantification of
damages and not the locus standi of the Italian government to pursue an action for
compensation for damage to the marine environment. The defendant argued that such
claims were inadmissible under the CLC/FUND ‘69/71 because;

6

Maine v. m/v. Tamano, 375 F.Supp. 1097, 1098.1973
A.M.C.1131.1131-1132 (D.Me.1973)
7
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.c.§ 1301et seq., 1301(e)
8

The Haven Incident (Italy 1991)
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...they were based on an abstract quantification of damage calculated in accordance
with theoretical models, contrary to Resolution No.3 adopted by the Fund Assembly in
9

1980 .

By failing to rebut the alleged standing of the Italian government to pursue actions as
owners of the damaged environment, the Fund impliedly consented to the fact that a
state has ownership and therefore standing to initiate an action to recover
compensation for oil pollution damage to the entire environment.

Notwithstanding the decisions of tribunals and the enactment of legislative acts
proposing that a state or one of its branches should have standing to bring suit for oil
pollution damage to the environment, some shortcomings can be registered against the
application of this concept.

The first problem that can be identified is the ambiguity involved in defining what the
environment really is. Defining the concept of the environment presents major hurdles,
because none of the major international treaties, declarations, codes of conduct or even
guidelines have afforded a direct and unequivocal definition of the term. Difficulties can
be encountered in the identification and restriction of the scope of such a term. It could
encompass anything from the whole biosphere to the habitat of the smallest creature or
organism.

Dictionary definitions are also very varied, ranging from something that environs to the
whole complex of climate, edaphic and biotic factors that act upon an organism or an
ecological community and ultimately determines its form or survival. The Concise
Oxford Dictionary10 defines the environment as; “... that surrounding objects, regions or
circumstances”.

9

Colin De La Rue (1998) Shipping and The Environment p.510

10

Concise Oxford Dictionary (5th Edn., Oxford, 1972), 406
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The World Commission on Environment and Development (which is expected to be the
leading authority on this subject) puts it in a more succinct way by holding that; “... the
environment is where we live”11.

By reason of these varied definitions, the environment can be considered to be an
abstract phenomenon. It could be very elusive to grasp and owing to this, even more
difficult to identify. For these reasons, it may be more fictional than real. Its use could
also be over expanded or restrictive.

Another pitfall that could be encountered in attributing ownership of the environment in
general and in particular the marine environment to a state, would be that relating to the
possession of some animal life that abounds within such an area. The idea of laying
claim of ownership over freely swimming fish in an international waterway, of stocks
that migrate from one region of the world to another as property identifiable to one
country or another is absurd and difficult to rationalise.

Fish of this nature (this includes shrimps, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp
and other marine animal life), are generally considered wild. In the McCready case cited
above, though the court was willing to recognise the fact that a state owns wildlife within
its territorial sea, it cast some doubts on the state’s capacity of asserting
ownership/property while the fishes are on the run. No absolute property can be
asserted in wild animals while they are alive. Ownership of this property can be
asserted only when such animal life has been reduced to possession. Then they
become the property of the possessor. The problems of attributing ownership of certain
animal wildlife to a state cannot be overlooked.

11

WCED, Our Common Future (Oxford, 1987), p.xi
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4.1.1.2

Locus Standi of A Corporate Body/ of A Private Person

The question of whether a corporate body, a private person or a particular group of
people can possess a substantive right of action with respect to claims for damage to
the environment cannot be ignored. While a lot of debate has been carried out to
support this notion vis-à-vis a state, one would be hesitant to accord the same level of
flexibility and acceptance when examining the position of the above-mentioned groups
of persons. In dealing with the corporate body, the departure point for the court and the
IOPC Fund will be that of determining what authority is vested upon the said body and
the mandate it is expected to exercise in connection to that environment.

Where it is established that the state has made an express grant to such a corporate
body to control and protect the environment by taking cleanup or restoration measures
after a disaster, the court and the Fund would be ready to accept the substantive right
of action of the body. Again the authority to control and protect the environment could
be evidenced by statute.12

Another situation of importance that merits attention is that of determining whether a
private person or an environmental group should have a substantive right to bring suit
against a shipowner, the P&I Club or the Fund for environmental damage. Though this
possibility is not clearly stated by the law, it is worthy of consideration. By claiming such
rights, the individual makes a manifestation of his contribution to the protection of the
environment. It will not be surprising to find an individual with more motivation to defend
and protect the environment than any governmental organisation. Such rights of suit
would of course be over and above the individual’s claim for compensation for damage
to private property. It should not be aimed at personal aggrandisement, but rather
directed towards the good of the wider public.

12

Zoe Colocotroni Case: 628F.2d 652 (Ist Cir.1980). , A.G.V. Emerson (1891) AC 649 (H.L.), at p.
653.Lord Herschell
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4.2

The Doctrine of Public Trust and
The Concept of Parens Patriae

These two concepts are among those that states have from time to time invoked as
giving them a right to claim compensation for environmental damage in the wake of an
oil pollution damage. Divergent views and opinions have been expressed to argue
whether a state can initiate an action for damages on behalf of its citizens relying either
on its position as trustee of the public trust in the environment, in other words as parens
patriae

of the national collectivity.

4.2.1 The Doctrine of Public Trust
As a widely accepted legal theory, the doctrine of public trust is to the effect that a state
may seek damages for pollution damage to its natural resources. Justification for this is
founded on the fact that these resources are held in trust by the government, on behalf
of the people and for the benefit of the public. This doctrine is particularly important in
the domain of marine pollution, as for its purposes, it traditionally applies to navigable
waters, submerged lands, commerce, fishing and recreational uses like boating and
swimming. It has been expanded to embrace the prevention of pollution with respect to
water, air and wetlands.

It further recognises the rights of a state within the context of compensation. The
doctrine is lauded for having created common law standards for judicial protection of
the public’s interest in the areas mentioned above, especially in situations where
legislation is absent.

Trusteeship depicts a situation where one person, not the legal owner of a property,
legally keeps and manages the said property on behalf of the legal owner for a definite
or indefinite period of time. Under this relationship, generally referred to as the trustee
relationship, (the state in this case) is expected to show proof of ultimate good faith
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insofar as the management of the property is concerned. Protecting these resources
held in trust against unfair dealing and dissipation is a display of good faith. An action to
recover compensation for oil pollution damage to the environment would be another
way of displaying the required good faith.

When faced with environmental damage, the state steps into the shoes of the public
whose environment it holds in trust. It then operates as a property owner whose
proprietary interest has been infringed. A right arising from this would be that of seeking
redress to the situation. The state can pursue an action to recover compensation all the
time, on behalf of the public whose property it holds in trust.

4.2.2 The Concept of Parens Patriae.
The origins of the concept of parens patriae can be traced to the English constitutional
system. The idea behind its creation was that of enabling the state as sovereign and
guardian of its peoples, to provide protection for persons under legal disability. Literally
translated, parens patriae means parent of the country. The concept has commonly been
invoked as a procedural device for asserting claims for damages or injunctive relief.

Like the doctrine of public trust, the concept of parens patriae seeks to recognise the
rights of a state or one of its branches to seek recovery of compensation for damage to
natural resources and various marine species in the area of a spill. According to this
concept, the state as parent of the country brings suit against the shipowner, the P&I
Club and the Fund for injury to the environment on behalf of the people. It is important
to point out here that as opposed to the notion of locus standi, a state that seeks to bring
a parens patriae action may do so even if the state as an entity has no proprietary interest
in the resources that have been injured by the spill.

44

Advocates of this concept, however, hold that two requirements must be met before a
state can successfully plead parens patriae as enabling it to bring an action for damages
to the environment following an oil spill. These are;
• the action must be predicated on state interest which by itself is separate from
injuries suffered by individual citizens,
• the spill and consequently the environmental damage must adversely impact a
substantial portion of the citizens of the state.
By seeking to construe this concept in favour of states, its proponents hold that state
interest will exist either when it suffers injury as a result of oil pollution damage to state
owned land, or where pollution injures the general welfare of its citizens. In the Trail of
Smelter Arbitration

case13 discussed earlier between the USA and Canada, it would have

been possible for the government of the USA to bring suit against the government of
Canada in its capacity as parens patriae to recover damages for pollution damage arising
from the activities of the citizens of Canada.

Though there is limited case law to suggest that the doctrine of parens patriae has been
successfully invoked by states as granting them a right to bring an action with respect to
damage to the environment, there is a possibility that this doctrine will be heavily relied
upon in future, as environmental issues are attracting more and more public attention.
In the Zoe Colocotroni14 case, the Environmental Quality Board of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico sought to recover damages for injury to natural resources and marine
species in the area of the spill as both trustee of the public trust in these resources and
in its capacity as parens patriae. The example above will be emulated by many other
states.

The defendant shipowner and the P&I Club challenged the plaintiff’s right to recover
damages “on behalf of its people for the loss of living natural resources on the land

13
14

3 U.N.R.I.A.A., iii, p.1905. Decision March 11 1941
628F. 2d 652 (Ist Cir.1980)
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such as trees and animals”15. Their argument was focused on the fact that by claiming
parens patriae

the state or its agency lacked sufficient proprietary interest in the damaged

resources. Parens patriae, which in essence is a mere variation of the public trust
doctrine, bestows upon a state an unexercised regulatory authority over wildlife. This
unexercised authority fails to support a proper cause of action for compensation on
behalf of the state. The Court of Appeal did not dwell on this issue, recognising however
the fact that the Commonwealth Environmental Board had been granted the authority
by the government to manage the damaged area.

Questions regarding a state’s right to pursue an action for damages to marine
resources again arose in the Patmos case16. In 1985, the Patmos collided with another
tanker in the Messina Straits and some 700 tons of oil was spilled. Though most of the
oil dispersed naturally, some of it hit the Sicilian coast, whereupon the Italian
government put forward a claim for damages to the marine environment in its capacity
as parens patriae. The court of First Instance, which considered that such a right did not
confer upon the Italian government a right of ownership over the affected area, rejected
this claim.

The Court of Appeal of Messina ruled otherwise, preferring to support the theory of
parens patriae

as giving a state sufficient authority to bring suit with respect to damage to

the marine environment. The court’s decision after the Haven Incident17 was considered in
the same light, with the Italian government being granted the entitlement to recover for
preventive measures where it could be proved that such claims had not been assigned
to other entities.

15

Abecasis W.D, and Jarashow R.L. (1985) Oil Pollution From Ships (Stevens & Sons Ltd)
London.p.552,§1
16
Patmos Incident (Italy, 1985).
17

The Haven Incident (Italy, 1991).
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The ability of the state to exercise its authority and rely on its capacity as parens patriae to
recover compensation for damage to the marine environment appears to be a growing
concern within legal circles. It should come as no surprise that many schools of thought
have sprung up with divergent views.

This writer (with respect to the renowned legal scholars and publicists who have written
on this subject) is of the following opinion. Following recognised principles of law, every
state has and enjoys supreme sovereignty over its landed territory, internal waters and
the territorial sea. Inherent in this sovereignty and among other things, is the right of
controlling activities that are carried out within its territory to ensure that such activities
do not infringe the interests of other states or its citizens.

Conversely, the state has the legal authority of protecting its own citizens, living and
non-living resources against any infringement. The marine environment is a component
of these resources. Where some damage is done to the marine environment, such a
state, by its government, or acting through a recognised agency, can take measures to
ensure that the damage caused is redressed. By so doing, it seeks to protect the
interest of its citizens. Where a state is recognised as possessing the inherent right of
protecting the interests of its citizens and resources, and the authority to protect and
preserve its marine environment,18 it would be contradictory to contend that such a
state lacks interest enough in that environment to enable it to recover damages when
the same resources and environment it protects and conserves are damaged.

Protecting the natural resources and the marine environment is not composed only of
taking preventive measures against unfair dealing and dissipation of the natural
resources. It does not only involve the exercise of an enforcement jurisdiction over such
areas. It comprises seeking compensatory measures where damage has been done to
these resources.

18

United Nations Law of the Sea Convention Article 21(d), (f).

47

For this reason, it is not necessary for the state to prove its proprietary interest in the
damaged environment. The proprietary rights in the damaged environment are inferred
as arising from the legal obligation it has in protecting both citizens and resources.
Wetlands, for example, would not belong to anyone and may be devoid of any direct
economic potentials. However, their importance in maintaining an ecological balance
within the marine environment can never be under- estimated. Pollution damage to
such an area could spark off a reaction, which could result in the destruction of some
plankton and benthos which though not needed for human consumption, constitutes an
important component in the food chain of certain valuable marine animal life.

Damage such as this, though not caused to a named person, should not be dismissed
as unfit for compensation on the basis that parens patriae does not create entitlement in
favour of the state to a right of action against the polluter. The status of parent of the
country exercised through sovereignty automatically confers on the state or its
recognised agencies a prima facie interest over the damaged environment. As such, this
capacity should provide for the state an enablement to bring a private claim on behalf of
its nationals for such damage.

It should be recalled that very little debate has been raised against the public trust
doctrine which awards to a state ownership of the environment. Parens patriae is in
essence a variation of the public trust doctrine. In the first situation, the state acts as the
owner of the environment on behalf of its peoples. It can initiate an action against the
shipowner, the P&I Club or the Fund where necessary for an infringement on that right.
In the second situation, a state’s action can be grounded on the basis of parent of the
country, as a representative of the national collectivity. In fact, the dividing line between
the two concepts is very thin.

The marine environment (a beach for example) is of immense importance. To some
states, it is more than an amenity. It represents a treasure, a source of life, which a
state would jealously guard and preserve for the benefit of its peoples and for posterity.
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It is commendable that the community of states recognises this and has taken
measures to enhance its protection and preservation. What it should do through
compensatory schemes like the CLC/FUND to promote marine environmental
protection, is not to raise objections relating to states’ capacity as parens patriae to bring
suit for oil pollution damage. Rather, it should work out ways and means whereby
double recovery by states and private persons for injury to the same resources can be
avoided. In this way, two things would be achieved;
• prevent polluters from suffering double jeopardy,
• create an awareness in the shipping, oil and insurance industries of the possibility of
facing claims from governments for oil pollution damage done to the marine
environment. This will call for greater awareness and higher standards and levels of
care in the exercise of their duties.
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CHAPTER 5

COMPENSABILITY: A REMEDY IN MARINE POLLUTION
Despite the best intentions of municipal and convention law, and the efforts of the
shipping and oil industries, marine pollution following upon a maritime casualty will
continue to occur. The rule of strict liability discussed in chapter three has been
imported into the CLC/FUND regimes. Its applicability, whenever the liability of the
shipowner and the cargo owner have been evoked with respect to oil pollution damage
claims, has ensured that compensation has almost always been available to victims.

Notwithstanding this fact, it has not been uncommon to find situations where
defendants (shipowners and the IOPC FUND) have raised strenuous arguments as to
whether a particular type of claim qualifies for compensation. The second part of
chapter 5 of this work will deal with this issue. Prior to this, in the first half of the
chapter, a brief overview of the general principles of law regarding the admissibility of a
claim grounded in tort, and its contributions to the domain of marine environmental
protection regimes will be made. As it will unfold, even where a particular claim has
transcended the rigours of admissibility, it is doubtful whether the compensation that
ensues is adequate in terms of amount payable considering the difficulties associated
with the quantification of compensation. As was with the other chapters, reference will
be made to decided cases.
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5.1

Principles of Judicial Remedy

In a society without norms, a society devoid of regulations that direct the conduct of
behaviour and govern societal acts and omissions, a loss or damage will lie wherever it
falls. In other words, the loss will be borne by whoever suffers it. This falls out with the
expectations of norm regulating societies, which are guided by the underlining principle
that the author of an act or omission that causes loss or damage to an innocent victim
should bear responsibility for such a loss or damage.

Thus, it is a recognized principle of law that a remedy should be made available to that
innocent victim by the perpetrator. The innocent victim should be compensated fully in
cash or in kind by what is referred to as restitutio in integrum. The purport of this judicial
remedy is to put the victim to the same position to which he was prior to the occurrence
of the wrongful act or omission.

Given that full restitution is rare to attain, mechanisms such as compensation, otherwise
known as damages are designed to provide the innocent victim with at least a monetary
recompense made equal to the loss or damage suffered. Within the spectrum of marine
pollution in general, and in particular oil pollution damage, restitutio in integrum could be
attained without too much of a problem, insofar as damage to property (physical res
such as vessels and fishing gears) is concerned. With respect to the environment, it
would be difficult to attain similar results due to the varied definitions of the
environment. Thus claimants who have suffered damage to the environment have to be
compensated in some innovative ways, albeit within the established principles of judicial
remedies. We shall see how far this has been achieved.

A claimant having satisfied the requirements mentioned in the preceding chapters, can
only receive compensation when he can establish a direct relationship or connection
between the act or omission and the loss or damage suffered. Establishing that the act
or omission was the proximate cause of the loss or damage is of primary importance.
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5.1.1

Causa Proxima

One of the elements that the law requires a claimant to establish is the relationship
between the alleged wrongful act or omission and the loss or damage suffered by the
claimant. In the first instance, the loss or damage suffered must have occurred as a
direct consequence of the wrong. It must be so near to it that, without its occurrence,
the victim would not have suffered the loss or damage. The victim must be in a position
to prove the nexus, the causal link between the wrongful act and the loss or damage
suffered. A failure to so prove will lead to the conclusion that the loss or damage is too
remote to be attributable to the defendant.

Developed and thoroughly established within the precincts of traditional tort law, the
notion of causa proxima, like the other principles of law discussed above, have played a
predominant albeit subtle role within the realm of liability and compensation in oil
pollution damage claims. Its influence will be discussed below. The problem of proving
causa proxima

is more acute where the loss or damage occurs as a result of burning oil,

which within the text of the CLC/FUND Conventions does not constitute a basis of
action. The position of the law has been well illustrated in the Wagon Mound I and II
cases. It is worthwhile mentioning that though these cases are pre-convention cases,
the rule of law that they established are well in use in oil pollution cases.
1

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (Wagon Mound I)

While anchored at Sydney harbour taking on board furnace oil, servants of the Wagon
Mound

(charterers and respondents) negligently permitted the escape of some of the oil

into the sea. Eventually winds carried the oil into the wharf where ship building and
repair work was being carried out.

1

Wagon Mound I (1960) 1 Lloyd’s Rep.1 (P.C), (1961) A.C. 388

52

After consultation with the wharf managers as to the safety of continuous welding
operations with floating oil around, the respondents managers were reassured of the
absence of any risk of fire from the floating oil and the welding operations continued. A
piece of molten metal eventually fell on a piece of cotton waste floating on the oil at that
time. This ignited the oil and the respondents’ wharf was damaged.
After an examination of the facts of the case and the existing law on the remoteness of
damage, the Supreme Court of New South Wales held the appellants liable for damage
to the wharf. However, on appeal the Privy Council, overturned that ruling.

The rationale behind the Privy Council’s decision in this case was guided by the fact
that the damage caused by the ignited oil floating on the surface of the harbour was too
remote to be considered a consequence of the oil spill. Such a damage was not
reasonably foreseeable and as such, the plaintiff failed to establish the causal link
between the defendant’s action and the damage suffered. The rule of foreseabilty thus
replaced the old rule of directness.
2

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Miller SS. Co. Pty Ltd. (Wagon Mound II)

Faced with a slightly different set of facts, the court, that is the Privy Council that ruled
in the Wagon Mound I3 arrived at a different conclusion. It held that the plaintiff’s loss was
reasonably foreseeable, as it was reasonably foreseeable that, wind movements could
carry floating oil to adjourning property thereby causing damage. The resulting damage
was not too remote.

Claims such as those arising under the Wagon Mound I & II cases (damage caused by oil
spilling into the sea and then catching fire) fall out of the realm of the CLC/FUND
Conventions. The text of the conventions will provide compensation for oil pollution
damage arising from contamination outside the ship, for the cost of reasonable
preventive measures, or for damage caused by such reasonable measures.
Nonetheless the IOPC Fund has constantly relied upon the elements that fall within the
2
3

Wagon Mound II (1966) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 657 (P.C), (1967) 1A.C.617
Ibid
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ambit of causa proxima (absence of reasonable foreseeability and remoteness of damage)
to oppose claims.
An example of this arose in the Antonio Gramsci II4 incident. In this case, claims initiated by
the Finnish government to recover compensation for expenses incurred in carrying out
surveys of damage to the environment resulting from oil spill upon the grounding of the
Antonio Gramsci

were outrightly dismissed by the Fund as being too remote. The

administrators of the Fund argued that the Finnish government in its regular pollution
prevention exercises would have incurred such expenses whether or not the Antonio
Gramsci

had spilled its cargo.

Wagon Mound I

& II provide an illuminating example supporting the principle that the

extent to which causa proxima (reasonable foreseeability and remoteness of damage)
which to this writer's mind are covered by the conventions under consideration as pure
economic loss, can be relied upon by a defendant remains not a question of fact, but
one that ought to be examined according to the merits of each case. The two major
legal systems (common and civil law) are consistent with the doctrine of causation in
tort cases. Common law rules of law would provide compensation to a claimant having
a proprietary interest over something damaged by asking the question “was it
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant that his act or omission would cause this loss
or damage to the plaintiff?” Rules of civil law dictate that the damage, on whose behalf
the claim is being made, must be direct and certain. The damage must be a close
consequence of the pollution incident. The bottom line of both systems is that there
must be a sufficiently close causal link between the pollution incident and the damage.

5.1.2

The Notion of Quantifiability

As mentioned earlier, the raison d’être of compensation is that of putting the victim as far
as is possible to the same position as he would have been in, had he not suffered the
4

Antonio Gramsci II (Finland,1987) Colin De La Rue ; Shipping and the Environment, p. 509
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wrong for which he is getting compensation. It denotes the payment of damages in
monetary terms, especially common in environmental damage claims. This calls for the
quantification of damages payable for the damage suffered.
Quantification for the most part, refers to the process by which claimants are able to
quantify the degree and extent of injuries suffered and damage to property or the
environment. It involves attaching a price tag, a monetary value to it. It is expected that
the monetary value will reflect the degree to which the victim is affected and can be
restituted to the position in which he was prior to the damage. As opposed to damage to
property, which can be easily ascertained by taking into consideration market value
minus depreciation cost, it is questionable whether damage to a given marine
environment can be properly quantified. There are some serious shortcomings
discussed below.

5.1.2.1

Limitation of Liability

The age-old rule by which shipowners can limit liability is one of the restrictions that a
plaintiff will have to contend with and which impacts on any quantification made.
Pursuant to this rule, the shipowner could originally limit his liability up to the value of
his ship. Thus the amount of damages that exceeded the value of his hip will not be
met.

Although the shipowner’s liability under the CLC/FUND package is far more generous
than any global limitation regime, due largely to supplementary amounts payable by the
Fund, its effects in this branch of the law are still felt. It is worth mentioning that the
plaintiff will not receive any amounts that go over and above limits set by the
conventions. The levels claimed after quantification will not change this position.
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5.1.2.2

Difficulties of Quantification

One of the primary hurdles of quantification with respect to environmental damage is
that relating to damage to natural resources. Firstly, claims arising under this heading
are rarely concerned with the compensation of loss or damage suffered by a particular
claimant. They are more concerned with the interest of the wider public. While the
purport of compensation is to provide redress for environmental damage, which for the
most part remains unremedied after clean-up operations, it is difficult to quantify such
damage following conventional pecuniary assessment methods. Some of these
difficulties are explained below.

5.1.2.3

The Innate Value of the Environment

Quite apart from the value of property, natural resources and the environment have
value of their own. However, this value is one with no price attached to it. To be able to
attach a monetary value to the environment, the starting point will be that of
ascertaining the value of the environment that has been damaged. This by itself is
difficult to achieve, considering that “any substantial part of the environment can be said
to be as priceless as …one of Chaucer’s plays.”5 The water, bed, fauna, flora are not for
sale. This innate value of the environment is the most priceless of them all. It provides a
source of life and is thus a cradle for mankind. In the Zoe Colocotroni6 case damage
caused to natural resources after an oil spill was calculated and awarded by the court of
first instance on the basis that such compensation was to represent the lowest
replacement cost. This decision was overruled at the Appeal Court as the court among
other things, failed to recognize the market value assigned to the environment.

5
6

Gotthard Gauci; Oil Pollution at Sea: Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage pg. 128 § 2
st
628F.2d 652 (1 Cir.1980)
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International law7 recognizes this value (not the monetary value though) and has
endorsed it by guaranteeing not only the protection of the global marine environment,
but also created protection for certain “special areas”8 deemed highly
vulnerable to oil pollution and other sources of pollution.

5.1.2.4

The nature of Environmental Damage

One of the cardinal problems of making an objective assessment and therefore of
quantifying damage to the environment stems from the very nature of the environment
itself. Unlike property such as vessels or fishing gears, the environment is not static but
in a permanent state of dynamism. Fluctuations in both plant and animals in terms of
species and numbers are common, due to natural phenomena, notably climatic
changes. Furthermore, most marine animal and plant life possess the ability of natural
recovery favoured by their ability to produce huge reserves of eggs and larvae which
will replace adult populations affected by short term adverse conditions. The reverse
can also be true of other species.

Against this background, one cannot infer with any degree of certainty that the
reduction in fish stocks or other marine resource must have been brought about by a
particular spill. Failure to compute the various elements raised above will without doubt
affect the precision of any quantification that can possibly be made. As such, any
assessments made after an incident will be speculative in character and capable of
raising controversies in the application of the regime.

5.1.2.5

Non-commercial Resources

Another factor that affects the remedial nature of compensation connected with
quantifiability, is that linked to damage to certain species of natural resources. Where

7
8

United Nations Law of the Sea Convention Article 192
MARPOL Annex I Chap.II.Reg.10
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marine fauna and flora are damaged by oil pollution, particularly damage to species that
are not economically exploitable, there is a problem of determining what the actual
value of the loss should be. Such values are difficult to translate into a price.

In addition, damage could be caused to certain plant and animal life, which though not
necessary for human consumption, constitutes a vital link in the food chain of aquatic
life. A disruption in the food chain would invariably have repercussions on the marine
ecosystem. Ecological damage neither has a market value, nor can it be calculated in
monetary terms.

5.1.2.6

Absence of Uniform Rules for Quantification

Due to the absence of uniform rules for quantification, diverse methods have been
employed by oil pollution damage victims to assess the extent of damage suffered and
the level of compensation expected. Often, such methods are done in accordance with
a plethora of existing municipal law, and usually, to the detriment of the IOPC Fund. It is
not uncommon to come across arbitrary and abstract measures of assessments, which
needless to say, have provided insurmountable obstacles to claimants. The IOPC Fund
has vehemently objected to such methods.

Arbitrary assessment methods have, if anything, highlighted the difficulties inherent in
the quantification of environmental damage in the absence of precise rules. The IOPC
Fund faced this problem in the Antonio Gramsci I & II cases.
9

Antonio Gramsci I

In 1979, the Soviet tanker Antonio Gramsci grounded near Ventspils in the Baltic Sea,
spelling some 5,500tons of her cargo. As a result Swedish, Finnish and USSR
coastlines damaged. The Russian government put forward a claim for environmental
damage calculated in line with municipal policy.
9

Antonio Gramsci I (USSR1979), Colin De La Rue ; Shipping and the Environmentp.507
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The Russian claims were settled, but this led the IOPC Fund’s Assembly in 1980 to
pass Resolution 3 stating its intention regarding the assessment of environmental
damage. By this Resolution, the assessment of environmental damage “is not to be
made on the basis of an abstract quantification of damage calculated in accordance
with theoretical models.” This resolution has to a very wide extent guided
compensations paid by the Fund with respect to environmental damage. The rationale
behind this declaration is that the Fund will resist all claims made against it similar to
that made by the Russian government.
10

Antonio Gramsci II

The Antonio Gramsci II ran aground South of Finland in 1987, spilling close to 700 tons of
crude oil. A Soviet oil combating operation deployed off the Estonian coast recovered
some 40 tons of the oil before been forced to abandon operations due to heavy
weather. The unrecovered oil caused pollution damage to the Finnish coast.

A claim for compensation for environmental damage submitted under the CLC was
made by the Estonian State committee for Environmental Protection and Forestry. The
assessment of the claim was again done following Soviet municipal legislation imposed
by the Methodika, the same formula employed by the USSR in the Antonio Gramsci I11 case.

The IOPC Fund’s reaction to this claim was different from that of the first case. It relied
on the provision of Resolution 3 cited above and resisted the Estonian claim, choosing
to refer the court to the wordings of that Resolution. Estonia eventually revised the
amount of the compensation sought and the matter was settled out of court. This rebuff
by the IOPC FUND is visibly indicative of the difficulties of making objective assessment
and quantification of environmental damage in the absence of agreed rules. The
difficulty speaks for itself.

10
11

Antonio Gramsci II (Finland,1987) Ibid, p.509
Ibid
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Situations have been known where the courts have had to rely on expert opinion when
controversy arises as to the extent of the damage and the level of assessment made
following oil pollution damage to the marine environment. The Italian Patmos12 and
13

Haven

cases are exemplary. The use of expert opinion in relation to quantification of

environmental damage has raised legal questions. It has seen the decline of the
absolute authority of the judiciary in awarding compensation, which is a legal concept. It
had witnessed the capitulation of the judge to the expert.

5.1.2.7

Long Term Effects of Oil Pollution Damage

The assessment of environmental damage would most often be done shortly following
an oil spill incident, and is normally done in a bid to satisfy public pressures, which have
continued to mount over the years. The negative fallout of these hasty assessments is
that consideration is never paid to the long-term effect of the oil in the environment. It
had been published some years after the Exxon Valdez incident, that crude oil found under
beach surfaces was still contaminating fish and wildlife14. Its impact on marine plant and
animal life cannot be ignored.

Conversely, public pressures brought to bear on political leaders in the wake of a tanker
casualty have led such officials to resort to exorbitant claims for compensation, often
undermining the fact that the environment does possess the capacity of natural
recovery. It is questionable whether compensation payable after an oil spill would
embrace the needs of future generations.

12
13

14

Patmos Incident, Italy, March 21 1985
Haven Incident, Italy, April 1991
Lloyd’s List, Casualty Report, 5 February 1993, p. 10
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5.2

Compensability: Adequacy

One of the major controversies that surrounds the concept of compensability as a
judicial remedy in general and in marine pollution claims in particular, is that linked to its
adequacy. The rationale of compensation (which is quantitative in character) as a
judicial remedy is to redress the victim’s loss by translating recoverable damages into
monetary terms. As a mechanism that seeks to make good the loss or damage suffered
by a victim, compensation is expected to be adequate. In other words, it should be
sufficient enough so as to place the victim to his pre-loss position. To be eligible for this
role, it must be adequate, given that compensation is a common form of reparation
where restitution in kind has proved impossible.

If the preceding factors are indications are to go by, then one could assert with a high
degree of certainty that compensation for oil pollution damage as provided within the
text of the CLC/FUND conventions leaves much to be desired. This is especially true
when the adequacy of compensation within the scheme is examined vis-à-vis
consequential loss, pure economic loss and restoration and re-instatement of the
environment are concerned.

5.2.1 Consequential Loss
Claims for consequential loss are those that are grounded on the fact that the oil spill
has actually infringed on the plaintiff’s proprietary interests. The loss suffered occurs as
a result of damage to the claimant’s property. Since its inception, the IOPC Funds have
faced very few difficulties with making payments for consequential loss.

The above notwithstanding, loss of this kind can sometimes be subjected to the rigours
of differentiation from pure economic loss. Sometimes, it is difficult to say whether or
not the damage suffered falls squarely within the meaning accorded this concept by the
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CLC/FUND regimes, or whether the loss has passed the test of reasonable
foreseeability.

Claimants have been known to recover compensation for damage caused to farms
along the coastline15 and buildings16 ashore by oily sprays though such damage could
not have been seen as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an oil spill.

Apart from claims for oil actually fouling neighbouring vessels and port facilities, most
claims for consequential loss are those brought by fishermen, fish farmers as well as
those involved in aquacultural, onshore and offshore activities. As opposed to
fishermen who seek to harvest fish in the wild, these latter groups of claimants own the
stocks, which their facilities contain. While contamination of their stocks will be regarded
as loss or damage to property, the law will consider their loss of earnings as
consequential loss. Making assessment aimed at quantifying such losses present no
problems. The market value of the stocks as well as the cost of contaminated
equipment and gears can be easily ascertained.

It has not been uncommon to find situations in which stocks such as these are
destroyed following government orders, or to preserve the confidence of the public,
even in the absence of evidence showing the inability of the stocks to depurate prior to
harvesting17.

15

Braer Incident, IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, p.58
Braer Incident, IOPC Fund Annual Report 1995, p. 61
17
IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, pp. 56,59
16
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Likewise, the Fund has been known to pay compensation to such farmers as in the
Braer

incident at least for the 1991 harvest18.

The question that can be raised with respect to compensation for consequential
damage is whether claims of this nature arise as a result of loss caused by
contamination as stipulated by the convention. Even where such claims are justifiable,
the degree to which they are adequate remains questionable.

5.2.2 Pure Economic Loss
Unlike consequential loss, pure economic loss is that loss which is sustained without
physical damage to any given property. In the spectrum of marine pollution, pure
economic loss is often the loss borne by persons engaged in businesses that are highly
dependent on the various uses of the seas and its amenities. The CLC/FUND
conventions both define pollution damage as “loss or damage caused outside a ship
carrying oil...”.19 It is arguable that the definition awarded this phrase thus embraces
compensation for pure economic loss.

Within this category of claimants, fishermen and hoteliers have found favour with the
Fund from its very beginnings. At the same time, some of the most difficult claims in
terms of principles that the Funds have had to contend with have come from this same
group of claimants.

Most legal systems have chosen to reject claims arising from pure economic loss on the
ground that they will promote liability “ in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class”.20 Notwithstanding the inclinations of some legal
systems, the FUND (which is a medley of principles of law emanating from different
legal systems), will continue to pay compensation for pure economic loss. Justification
18

The Braer Incident (UK.January 1993)
IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993,pp.56,59
20
Ultramares .v. Touche, (1931) 225N.Y.179
19
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for this could be that the regimes continue to grope for societal support and acceptance,
as it strives to meet the needs and expectations of this same society as far as oil
pollution from ships is concerned.

It is worth mentioning that while claims for pure economic loss are allowed by the Fund
regime, some of these claims notably those from fish processing industries, hoteliers in
the middle of the country, would be resisted by the compensation system (due to
physical remoteness). These claims are treated as remote as per the rules of
foreseeability. Infact, what the regime will look for is whether a sufficient link exists
between the loss and the pollution incident, with each case being examined according
to its merits. It should come as no surprise therefore that this has resulted in
considerable uncertainty as to the admissibility of any claim.

Not even the criteria set up by the Fund’s Seventh Inter-sessional Working Group
mandated to find ways of mitigating these discrepancies have done much to help. This
body laid down the criteria for determining reasonable proximity (causal link) between
pollution incident and the loss based on; the geographical proximity between the activity
and the contamination, degree of claimants’ dependency on the activity, existence of
alternative supply sources to the claimant and the extent to which the claimant’s activity
impacts the economic activity of the area affected by the spill. The last criterion does
not promote man’s quest for self-satisfaction.

Without prejudice to the wisdom that motivated this trend of thought, this last criteria
should not be allowed to pre-empt the possibility of recovering damages for pure
economic loss. If this were to provide justification for a cause of action leading to the
payment of compensation, then what the Fund is doing, is aligning the interests of
victims to those of the community within which they operate.
Generally, a small hotelier for example, will invest in his business single handedly.
Alone he will bear all the attending risks to that investment. Among such risks, which
could negatively impact his investment, are strikes from airlines, bad weather
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conditions, and fire and oil pollution. These could result in poor bookings by tourists. At
moments of risk taking, no considerations are given to the inter-relationship between his
venture and the vicinity in which he finds himself. If compensation could be made
available to him, arising out of a damage caused by any of the above risks, there should
be no reason for not doing so primarily because his business does form an integral part
of the economic activity within the area affected by the spill.

The uncertainty with which the Fund deals with claims relating to pure economic loss
has been best demonstrated in the way in which claims by fishermen arising from
different oil pollution incidents have been treated. A claim by fishermen following the
21

Aegean Sea

incident was allowed as the IOPC Fund held that, the absence of a valid

fishing license was not a relevant pre- requisite for obtaining compensation for oil
pollution damage.
Barely one year later, the position of the IOPC Fund shifted. It declared in the Braer22
incident that, because within the UK territorial waters, fishing without a valid license
constitutes an illegal activity, a claim brought by a fisherman without a license would bar
any rights for compensation by such a claimant made against the Fund.

By deciding each claim for pure economic loss on its merits, it could be said with a
narrow margin of error that the Fund exercises discretionary powers in its awards. This
could threaten the compensation regime to its very foundation. This illustrates and
brings out one of the weaknesses of the CLC/FUND regimes.

21

Aegean Sea Incident, Spain, December 1992
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Braer Incident United Kingdom, January 1993
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As an international scheme striving for global recognition and acceptance, its scope of
applicability and the degree of certainty in settling claims should reflect high levels of
uniformity and homogeneity that would enable it gain the respect it deserves from the
industry. Such qualities are not yet visible in the scheme. Small wonder therefore that a
major oil importing nation like the USA has opted to go its own way.

5.2.3 Restoration and Re-Instatement
With reference to the conventions, claims for restoration or re-instatement are those
that relate to recovering the cost of the measures taken to restore or re-instate the
natural resources after the oil spill. These measures usually call for human intervention
in the process of natural recovery. They serve as a catalyst to natural recovery and
would sometimes demand that the entire resource be replaced by either replanting
vegetation, or providing temporal makeshift habitats for marine wildlife where immediate
restoration has failed. Such measures are aimed at restoring the natural resources to
their pre-spill conditions.

Viewed superficially, such claims do not appear to present any problems in terms of
monetary assessments, as all costs incurred can be readily quantified. The difficulty
connected to claims for compensation for restoration or re- instatement measures arise
in the application of convention provisions, as these instruments provide a questionable
yardstick; the reasonableness of the restoration or re-instatement measures.

Considerations that are given by the Fund are tilted not primarily towards the claimant’s
right to receive compensation for such costs, but rather to the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the measures taken to effectively restore or re-instate the
damaged resources. Thresholds for reasonableness on the other hand are influenced
by the prospects of their success, their feasibility and to a large extent, the ability of the
affected area to recover naturally. All the above factors are considerations that play an
influential role in assessing the damage that the oil pollution may have caused to the
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natural resources. Further considerations will be given to the advantages of the said
measures. Reasonableness becomes subjective when the Fund simply estimates that
certain measures of restoration or re-instatement are unreasonable, and opposes a
claim for compensation.
In the Zoe Colocotroni23 case, the court rejected the proposed plan for restoration of the
mangrove forest evaluated at US$ 6 million because it was unreasonably high.
Frequently, the use value of the natural resource to be restored or re- instated will
enable the Fund to decide whether or not its cost, hence the compensation sought is
reasonable.

As mentioned above, the CLC/FUND regimes do not award compensation as a medium
for making good profits lost by the damage. Rather, compensation is provided as a
remedy to a loss suffered, aimed at restituting the claimant to the pre-spill position.
Claims for compensation for costs of restoration or re-instatement serve the same
purpose. As such, one can infer that the level of compensation would be limited to the
cost of restoration or re- instatement. This cost does not include the interim loss, that is,
the loss that the claimant endues throughout the period that it takes to restore or reinstate the natural resource to its original condition.

Interim costs reflect the deprivation that arises from the non-use of the resource that the
claimant endures. Such a loss could be evaluated and compensated. For compensation
to be adequate it must include the actual cost incurred for restoration or re- instatement
as well as that incurred from the interim loss. Anything short of this will make
compensation under this heading inadequate as a judicial remedy.
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CHAPTER 6
INSURANCE AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
IN OIL POLLUTION CASES
Following the introduction of the strict liability regimes through the CLC and Fund, one
would have expected that all deserving victims of oil pollution damage would receive
compensation that would put them into the pre-spill position. Notwithstanding the
imposition of strict liability by the regimes on the owner of the vessel following an oil
pollution incident, it will not be uncommon to find situations in which the liability of the
shipowner cannot be successfully invoked. This is due to the fact that he can
completely exonerate himself from liability by pleading certain defences or by invoking
limitations.

In this chapter, the notion of the limitation of liability, and its application in both the
common and civil law systems will be examined. Its purpose in the domain of oil
pollution will be discussed under 6.1. The latter half of the chapter (6.2 & 6.3) will deal
with the concept of insurability and the limitation levels of the 1992 CLC and Fund
Convention.

6.1

Development of Limitation of Liability

In maritime law, the liability of the shipowner for loss or damage caused to others is
usually limited. This is the rule, which sets shipping apart from most other branches of
commerce. The concept of limitations of liability has been in existence long before the
conventions.
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The basis for the existence of the right to limit liability was that, there was a need to
encourage the adventurous pursuits of shipowners who were prepared to gamble their
assets (the ship) by subjecting them to the uncertainties and perils of the sea. In the
absence of such limitation, it was highly probable that a shipowner would abandon the
ship together with the freight in the hands of third parties with valid claims against him.
This of course was not economically beneficial to the aggrieved third parties that ran the
risk of never recovering their losses, especially in cases where the liability of the
shipowner was over and above the value of his assets.
Furthermore, it came to be realised that the third party with a valid claim stood a better
chance of recovering some substantial proportion of his compensation if it was limited.
This was better than dwelling in the uncertainties of not knowing whether or not they
would ever receive the higher sums to which they were entitled.
The existence and application of the rule of vicarious liability was to favour the survival
of the shipowner’s right to limit his liability. It was considered fair that a person, who
through his own fault caused loss or damage to another, should be liable without limit to
that loss or damage. Conversely, rules of fairness and justice would not allow a
shipowner to be fully liable (without limit) to another person for a loss or damage
caused by the fault or neglect of his servants. Against this background, different legal
systems developed rules relating to the right of the owner’s ability to limit his liability.

6.1.1 Limitation of Liability under English Law
Under English admiralty law, the liability of the shipowner was unlimited, at least until
well into the mid 18th century. Developments within other legal systems favoured a shift
toward the limitation of the shipowner’s liability for loss of cargo by theft of the master or
crew, to the value of the ship and freight.1 Eventually, limitation was extended to cover
cases of theft by persons other than the crew and by fire.

1

Responsibility of Shipowner’s Act 1733
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Despite the introduction of this rule, it was not to be until the early years of the 19th
century that the notion of limiting the shipowner’s liability for damage arising from
collision cases began to filter into English admiralty law. Here, like in the prior
situations, liability was limited to the value of the ship and the pending freight. A
different standard for limitation was set by the Merchant Shipping Act 1958 of the
United Kingdom, which incorporated the 1957 Limitation Convention. Under this Act,
limitation was calculated by reference to the tonnage of the ship. This was thought to
provide a more certain basis as far as indemnification was concerned, as opposed to
the uncertain value of the ship and pending freight alternative. The uncertain value of
the ship had the effect of rewarding an owner who did not spend money on
maintenance by leading to lower liability, due to lower value of the vessel.
At that time, justification for this rule was founded on the grounds of public policy. It was
one of the first instances in which state support for the shipping industry, and an
acknowledgement of the risks run by shipowners was manifested. In The Amalia 2, Dr.
Lushington was swift in pointing out in very clear and unequivocal terms that; “The
principle of limited liability is that full indemnity, the natural right of justice, shall be
abridged for political reasons.”
Convenience was also another reason for which English law advocated the application
of this rule. In The Bramley Moore: Alexandra Towing Co.v. Millet3, Lord Denning pointed out
that, though the concept of limitation of liability could not be considered as rational
justice, it was convenient for the purposes for which it was intended.
The above notwithstanding, one of the unique characteristics of limitation of liability
under the English law was that, though the shipowner could limit his liability, the onus of
proving that the incident did not occur as a result of his actual fault or privity rested on him.
The use of these words is indeed meaningful and significant in the entire scope and

2

3

The Amelia (1863) Br. & Lush. 151; 176 E.R. 323, 1 Moo. P.C:N.S. 471 p. 473
The Bramley Moore: Alexandra Towing Co.v. Millet 3. (1964) P.200, 200.

70

structure of shipping law, and is discussed below. In this way, all the victim had to
prove, was the causal link between the incident and the loss or damage suffered.

6.1.2 Limitation of Liability Under Civil Law
In civil law, the shipowners’ right to limit liability existed long before the notion was
adopted in English law. Codified customary law as practised in the Mediterranean as far
back as the 13th and 14th centuries, the Consolato Del Mare contained in its 33rd chapter,
the rule that “the owners of shares in a vessel are not liable in respect of claims against
the vessel in excess of their share.”4 French legislation in 1681 recognised the principle
of limitation of liability as it provided that, “ the owners of the vessel shall be responsible
for the acts of the master, but shall be discharged by abandoning the vessel and the
freight.”5 Later ordinances were to confirm limitation of liability by abandonment of the
ship and pending freight.6 This right could be denied the shipowner where claimant
could prove that the incident was caused by the faute personnel, personal fault of the
defendant shipowner. All civil law countries both in Europe and in South America then
adopted this rule.
The meeting points between the two major legal systems insofar as the notion of
limitation was concerned, lies in the fact that both systems found the necessity of
limiting liabilities in respect of shipowners. Secondly, such limitations were calculated
on the value of the ship and of the pending freight. The reference made by the civil law
system to abandonment does not alter the position.
However, under common law, limitation of liability was considered to be a privilege of
the shipowner, but not a right. As such, the defendant who intended to rely on this
privilege bore the onus of proving that the incident did not occur as a result of his actual
fault or privity.

4
5

6

Under civil law, the defendant could successfully plead his right to

Essays on Maritime Legislation Vol. I p. 253
Ibid.
French Code of Commerce 1807 Article 216
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limitation, unless the claimant could prove that the incident was caused by the faute
personelle,

personal fault of the defendant shipowner.

This distinction between the two systems merits some comments. In English law, the
shipowner was denied the right to limit his liability unless he could prove that the
incident did not occur as a result of his actual fault or privity, thereby connoting
blameworthiness. For all intents and purposes, actual fault or privity has been judicially
interpreted in a way to break limitations. Thus a right to limitation will be denied him
even if the incident resulted from something which he reasonably ought to have known
or done as in The Lady Gwendolen 7. In this case, the shipmaster had repeatedly sailed at
high speed. Due to thick fog and excessive speed, The Lady Gwendolen collided with
another ship, causing it to sink. The court held that the plaintiff could not invoke the right
to limitation. This accident could have been avoided had the ship superintendent
examined the ship’s log, as he ought to have done.
In ruling on limitations, courts apply the alter ego principle, that is, they look beyond the
shipmaster to see who, under certain circumstances was responsible for the
management of the ship. Thus they impute liability on to the top management of the
ship. The alter ego doctrine in shipping has become more easy to apply by virtue of the
introduction of the “designated person” under the ISM Code.
Again, where the shipowner chooses, or pretends not to have known something the
existence of which he ought to have known, and knowledge of which he would have
used to prevent an incident, he would be barred from pleading his right to limitation.8
For the purposes of this system as well as the CLC, turning a blind eye on something,
or refraining from inquiring will suffice as knowledge. Faute personnelle could be regarded
as much more restrictive. It denotes the doing of something, or actually omitting to do
something.

7
8

The Lady Gwendolen [ 1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335, pp. 340, 344 ,348
The Eurysthenes (1976) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171,CA
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It is worth pointing out that though the two legal systems had somewhat different
approaches the international maritime community for various reasons saw the necessity
of accepting limitation. This recognition and acceptance led to the creation of global
regimes aimed at limiting the liability in 1924 and again in 1957. There is also the global
limitation regime embodied in the 1976 Convention on the Limitation of Liability for
Maritime Claims (LLMC). Regrettably a discussion of this regime does not fall within the
scope of this dissertation. The notion of limitation developed under the two legal
systems described above, greatly influenced the concept of limitation of liability with
respect to oil pollution damage claims as much as they influenced the global limitation
regimes.

6.1.3 Limitation of Liability in Oil Pollution:
The CLC/FUND 1969/71, 1992 Conventions
It should be recalled that the CLC/FUND conventions were built upon three cardinal
doctrines; strict liability, limitation of liability and compulsory insurance. The liability of
the shipowner for oil pollution damage was strict. There was no need for the victim to
prove fault on the part of the shipowner. By itself, this rule was hard on the shipowner.
To undermine the rigours of the Rylands v. Fletcher 9 rule, defences such as war or related
activities, natural phenomenon, act or omission of a third party, wrongful act of any
government, proportionate fault of the victim could erase the shipowner’s liabilities.10
Without doubt these exceptions could bring about a reduction of the victim’s chances of
recovering any compensation for oil pollution damage. At the same time, a shipowner
may find it difficult to invoke these defences, and as such, will be faced with strict
liability.
The CLC/FUND subscribed to a limitation regime acknowledging a traditional privilege.
Its purpose was two fold; the one to compensate the stringent basis of liability it

9

Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R.3 H.L 330, (1868), L.R. 1 Ex. 265 pp.270-280
CLC 69 Article III(2) (a-c) Fund 71 Article 4(2)(a),(3), CLC 92 Article III(2)(a-c)

10
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ushered in, and the other, to apportion the burden of oil spills between the shipping and
oil importing industries.
Another reason for having limitation of liability was the role of the insurance interest in
this domain. By virtue of CLC 1969,11 the shipowner can limit his liability to an
aggregate amount for each ton of the ship’s tonnage. The same convention
extinguishes this entitlement to limitation if the actual fault or privity of the owner resulted in
the incident.12
As regards the right to limitation in the 1992 instruments, the shipowner has an
entitlement to limit his liability to an aggregate depending again on the tonnage of the
ship13. Limitation amounts are set as follows; 3 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for
vessels of 5000 units of gross tonnage, 3 million SDR, plus 420 SDR per additional unit
of gross tonnage for vessels of 5000-140,000 units of gross tonnage, and 59.7 million
SDR for vessels of 140,000 units of gross tonnage and above.14 Unlike its original
version, the loss of the right to plead limitation of liability arises not from the actual fault or
privity

of the owner, but only where it is proved “that the damage resulted from his

personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or
recklessly and with the knowledge that such a damage would probably result.”15
The interpretation of the wordings of this provision is more onerous on the claimant, as
such a claimant is faced with a double-barrelled task. Firstly, he is required to prove that
he has suffered damage as a result of the alleged wrongful act or omission of the
shipowner. Secondly, he must prove mens rea and actus reus on the shipowner’s part, as if
it were penal proceedings, and that the shipowner should have contemplated the
occurrence of the damage. In fact, the 92 regime converted the privilege existing under
the 69/71 regime into a right, and made it next to impossible for a claimant to impute
conduct barring limitation on the shipowner.
11

Civil Liability Convention 1969 Article V (1)
Ibid.
13
CLC 1992 Article V(1) (a)
14
Ibid. Article V (1) (b)
15
CLC 92 Article V (2)
12
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Like the 1957 Global Limitation Convention, the 1969/71 CLC/FUND regimes are silent
as to the party on whom the onus of proving the absence of actual fault or privity lies. All
the regimes provide for, is an empowerment to limit liability,16 as well as conduct that
will bar the defendant shipowner from invoking that privilege. They do not require the
shipowner to produce any evidence to show absence of actual fault or privity. A pitfall of
this vacuum is that variations relating to the burden of proof may exist under different
national laws. The CLC/FUND regimes may be subjected to varying interpretations on
this matter, and as such the principles of law prevalent within the forum before which an
action is brought will be mirrored.
Conversely, it can be inferred that, the silence of the 1969/71 CLC/FUND regimes could
be construed as meaning that the onus of proving the absence of conduct barring
limitations lies on the shipowner. It is incumbent on him to prove that neither he, his
crew nor any other person for whom he may have had authority was responsible for the
incident. Such an inference could be drawn from the consideration that, the shipowner
who elects to lay claim of a privilege to limit liability must be in a position to prove the
absence of actual fault or privity on his part. Rules of equity will also favour this line of
reasoning.
It had been mentioned that the important role that the insurance market was expected
to play to render the liability and compensation regimes for oil pollution damage
effective was one of the factors that favoured the adoption of the limitation of liability
into the CLC/FUND. This role as well as its impact is examined below.

6.2 The Concept of Insurability in Oil Pollution Damage
Rules of strict liability and limitation of liability were born out of the desire of ensuring
that the victims of oil pollution damage were promptly and adequately compensated
whenever the need arose. This intention would have been defeated where the
claimants are faced with a bankrupt shipowner. Furthermore, a ship may be completely

16

CLC 69 Article V (2)
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damaged or wrecked following upon a maritime casualty. Claimants in this situation will
find it needless to attach a maritime lien on such a res.
To forestall this situation, the CLC/FUND regimes instituted the requirement of
compulsory insurance or other financial security on all ships carrying more than 2,000
tons of crude oil as cargo17. By so doing, the shipowner insures his liabilities vis-à-vis
third parties arising under the conventions. Within the realm of the CLC/FUND regimes,
this is an indemnity insurance, obtainable via P&I Clubs. A right of direct action against
the insurer is also recognised.
Although compulsory insurance is not a new concept in international law18, its use is not
frequent. Its principal objective is to cater for third party liabilities. As opposed to ship or
cargo insurance where the value of the subject- matter of the insurance contract is
known and easily assessed, liability insurance would require that the insurer seriously
considers whether or not he is prepared to take the risk of covering uncertainties.
Normally, the shipowner can expect better and adequate insurance coverage for third
party liabilities if the insurers are certain of, and can calculate the highest limits of the
risks they accept to run. The limitation of liability serves to make the insurer’s risk
assessable, and therefore premia affordable.
By imposing compulsory insurance on the shipowner, the regime ensures that, some
evidence of financial responsibility flows from the shipowner. This is a guarantee that
the shipowner is in a position to honour any liabilities that he may incur arising under
the convention. It is for this reason that the P&I clubs offer a comparatively extensive
coverage vis- à-vis third party liability than the general insurance market.
To drive home the importance attached to compulsory insurance, all tankers to which
this requirement is applicable, are required to be issued a certificate attesting to the
17

CLC 1969 Article VII (1), CLC 1992 Article VII (1)
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Damage Caused by Aircrafts to
Third Parties on the Surface 1933 (The Rome Convention).
18
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appropriate coverage. This responsibility lies with the flag state of the ship. In this way,
the shipowner manifests his consent to act as the guarantor for the liabilities arising out
of the conventions. To strengthen this provision, contracting states must ensure by
providing in their national law that, ships carrying more than 2,000 tons of crude oil in
bulk as cargo must have an insurance certificate. In this way, even ships registered in
non-contracting states must show proof of P&I coverage insofar as they intend to trade
to a contracting state. The significance of this is that, it enables victims of oil pollution
damage to bring direct action against the insurer for oil pollution damage. However,
even with this requirement, the insurer can still limit his liability under CLC. The
threshold of his limitation will not exceed that provided in article V (1) of the convention.
From the preceding, it can be deduced that insurability has ensured the success of the
liability and compensation regimes for oil pollution damage. In its absence, the survival
of the conventions remains questionable. Strict liability in the absence of financial
security to back it up is worthless. Victims faced with an insolvent shipowner would go
without compensation. These factors being apart, this writer contends that insurability
as employed in the CLC is not flawless.
Firstly, by limiting the size of the tankers entitled to subscribe for compulsory insurance
to those carrying more than 2,000 tons of crude oil as cargo, the regimes have
exonerated potential polluters from providing evidence of financial security. The wisdom
behind this decision could have been motivated by economic considerations. The
financial burden imposed by the compulsory insurance regime is heavy. The tonnage
limit therefore, may have aimed at exempting small ships from this burden.
Be that as it may, there is no guarantee that oil cannot be discharged or spilled from a
tanker carrying some 1,200 tons of crude. Even fewer guarantees can be provided
against the possibility that such a spillage will not cause serious pollution damage. In
the absence of the compulsory insurance regime, claimants who suffer damage from
this category of ships can only seek recourse to national law for recompense if
available.
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A second shortcoming that can be registered against the regime of compulsory
insurance and the notion of insurability is that it gives the insured an implied right to
pollute. The intention of this provision may have been good, (insuring liabilities arising
out of the convention). However, by subjecting the shipowner under such a stringent
financial regime, is tantamount to saying that he has to buy a right to pollute. This is
more evident when the rationale behind third party liability insurance is examined. The
allegation that insurability provides the shipowner an implied right to pollute is
buttressed by the possibility that a claimant can take direct action against the insurer,
while the shipowner, especially an insolvent one goes free.
The knowledge that upon the payment of a premium (which constitutes consideration in
law) some other entity or person would be legally bound to pay compensation for oil
pollution damage, may provide incentive to a owner of an unseaworthy vessel to
venture out to the sea. The more unseaworthy a vessel is, the higher the probability that
it will succumb to the perils of the sea, and the greater the risk of accidental spillage. On
the other hand, it can be argued that most underwriters will provide coverage for a
vessel that is classed and certified as seaworthy by a renowned classification society.
However, the shipowner’s temptation to use a vessel because he has financial back up
flowing from the P&I club should not be completely dismissed. The frequent detention of
vessels classified as “rust buckets” by port state control officers during port state control
inspections can support this contention.
Another factor, which this writer identifies to be more of a concern than a flaw that
arises out of the requirement of compulsory insurance, is that, linked to the preservation
of interest. As mentioned earlier, risk underwriters will demand that a vessel be
appropriately classed and remain classed prior to the provision of the insurance
coverage, and during the validity of the coverage. Their pre-occupation is principally
that the vessel in question is safe and fit for the purposes for which it is intended, and is
therefore linked directly to the safety requirement of the ship, and not the protection of
the environment. In this way, their interests are better preserved, as safer ships will
mean fewer accidents and even fewer claims for compensation.
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On the other hand, the shipowner will be required to pay higher premiums if the P&I
Clubs are faced with frequent third party liability claims. To avoid this, the shipowner
has an interest to ensure that his vessel is properly maintained. In this way he, as well
as the risk underwriter, have an interest to preserve. Should such preservation of
interest indirectly lead to the promotion of environmental protection, then the regime of
compulsory insurance can be said to have a deterrent effect on the shipowner. As such,
it merits its place within the realm of the international liability and compensation
regimes. If it is otherwise, then, there is a need to revisit the conventions to give them
that effect.

6.3

Limits of the 1992 CLC/FUND Conventions

The CLC 1992 Convention extended the definition of pollution damage, which among
other things include “... contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from
the ship…for impairment of the environment …reasonable measures of reinstatement
actually undertaken or to be undertaken.”19 This definition embraces damage to the
environment, and as such constitutes one of the main hurdles to this convention as
explained below.
It should be recalled that one of the main purports of the liability and compensation
regimes is to provide swift and adequate compensation to the victims of oil pollution
damage. The Fund has been reputed for swift settlements of claims. However, the
difficulties that surround the assessment of claims for damage to the environment could
result in prolonged uncertainties regarding the total amount of admissible claims. By
extension, this is prejudicial to victims with valid claims who will have to experience long
delays in the settlement of their claims.

19

CLC 92 Article I(6) (a), Fund 92 Article 1(2)
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According to the provision cited earlier, compensation for damage to the environment is
limited to the cost of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken by the
claimant. It follows therefore that where the claimant is unable to undertake restoration
or reinstatement measures due to the intensity of the damage, such a claimant would
not receive any compensation, even though it is visible that some damage has been
suffered. Although the objective of the convention is purely environmental, and not one
aimed at enriching government coffers, a situation as that described above is similar to
that of letting the loss lie where it falls mentioned earlier. A situation as this may be rare,
but an eventuality of this kind should not be ruled out. Furthermore, an immediate
assessment of reinstatement measures to be undertaken may fail to reflect long term
reinstatement requirements.
By limiting compensation obtainable with respect to damage to the environment to the
cost of reinstatement measures actually undertaken or to be undertaken, a dividing line
between recoverability and irrecoverability of claims has been drawn. At the same time,
this requirement may provide an incentive to contracting states to seek recompense
outside the convention insofar as certain claims are concerned, as for example under
municipal law. The IOPC Fund has witnessed such a situation in the Haven20, Aegean
21

Sea

and the Braer 22 incidents.

CLC 1992 has replaced the requirement of exoneration of liability or limitation of liability
from actual fault or privity on the shipowner with “ personal act or omission committed with
the intention to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such
damage would probably result.”23 This indicates that it must be proved that the
shipowner could have reasonably foreseen the consequences of his act or omission.
The onus of proving reasonable foreseability lies on the claimant. This burden is a
heavy one, and has been considered as a quid pro quo for the higher limits of liability

20

The Haven incident (Italy, 1991)
Aegean Sea (Spain, 1992)
22
Braer incident (UK,1993)
23
CLC 1992 Article III
21
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introduced by the 92 regime. Until the claimant can discharge this burden, the
shipowner can enjoy the right to limit his liability.
Due to the fact that it is difficult for claimants to prove that the shipowner’s conduct was
such that he cannot rely on his right to limit liability, it is argued that this provision has
played favourably into the hands of the insurance market. Some scholars argue that
there is a need to abolish limitations, as is the case with other oil pollution liability and
compensation regimes. It is alleged that this provision found its way into the convention
thanks to third party liability underwriters.
Although the 1992 instruments contain certain flaws, it is generally accepted that its
merits by far outweigh its demerits. Among other things, it has expanded the scope of
applicability of the regime by providing a wider geographical scope.24 It provides
compensation with respect to costs incurred for reasonable preventive measures25 even
when no spills occur. It is enough that there was grave and imminent threat of oil
pollution damage. Furthermore, spills of bunker oil from unladen takers are covered as
well as those emanating from combination tankers under certain circumstances.
Another advantage introduced by the 1992 instrument was the uplifting of the threshold
of compensation by both the CLC and Fund Conventions. They also provide a much
more simplified procedure for any further increase.26 The list of persons against whom it
is prohibited to bring an action for oil pollution damage has been extended.27
In light of the foregoing observations, it comes as little surprise that the administrators
of the 1992 instruments deem it important that more and more states should denounce
the original version of the CLC/Fund in favour of the 1992 regime. As more member
states denounce the “old regime” in favour of the “new regime”, the total quantity of
contributing oil, on which contributions are assessed, continues to diminish. The end
result will be an increased financial burden on the remaining states.
24

CLC 1992 Article II (a)
CLC Article II (b)
26
CLC Article XIIter:15
27
CLC 1992 Article III (4)
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The fear that the 1971 states will be unable to pay compensation in the wake of a major
incident owing to the unavailability of funds will be more real as Italy awaits its
accession to the 1992 regime on the 16th of September 2000. Her denunciation of the
1971 regime goes operational come October 8th 2000. To date, Italy remains a major
contributor to the 69/71 regime.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
From its very beginnings, the entire notion of liability and compensation for oil
pollution damage as embodied in the CLC/FUND has been concerned with the
apportionment of liability between the shipping and oil industries on the one hand,
and search for a balance between the different interests arising from an oil spill on
the other hand. During the 30 years of its existence, the CLC/FUND regimes have
covered a lot of ground as far as establishing the framework for attributing liability
and the payments of compensation are concerned. This progress can be noted as
follows;
• it has moved away from a marked absence of legal responsibility on the part of
the shipowner following an oil spill incident to instituting a regime of strict liability;
• it has evolved from inadequate compensation evident in the 1969/71 regime to
one that has significantly increased the amount of compensation payable an
increase embodied in the 1992 Protocol;
• it has successfully woven an intricate web that has favoured the growth of mutual
understanding between the parties liable for oil pollution damage . This,
notwithstanding the fact that these parties cry out loud against the weight of their
financial burden under the convention. The revised version of the CLC/FUND
conventions have introduced even better and higher benefits to claimants as
pointed out in chapter 6.

However, the story of the CLC/FUND regimes in both their original and revised
versions has not been a complete success story. Most of the demerits of the regime
are connected with the vagueness with which certain provisions of the convention
have been drafted. The absence of precise definitions has given rise to differences
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in interpretations of some of the convention provisions in different jurisdictions.
These varied interpretations have prevented the uniform application of the regime.

Apart from the differences in interpretation, another question is beginning to draw
public attention. This is related to the objection frequently raised by the IOPC Fund
with respect to the ability of governments or agencies acting on their behalf to
recover compensation for damage to the environment. The notion of locus standi and
the concept of parens patriae have often been considered by the Fund as not
providing governments or agencies acting on their behalf enough standing to bring
suit against the Fund for damage to the environment. In fact the Fund contends that
parens patriae

creates a regulatory right in favour of governments to manage natural

resources. This right it argues, is distinct from ownership. As such, it does not
create a proprietary interest in the natural resources in favour of governments. In
the absence of a proprietary interest, a government cannot be heard to espouse an
action with respect to oil pollution damage to the environment.

In response to these arguments, governments have contended the contrary.
Although this issue is yet to be settled by national courts of member states, it would
not be surprising that it will raise great concerns sooner than later. More and more
governments are vesting such proprietary interests on themselves through statute.
This is more so when one considers the great attention that oil pollution incidents
attract from the general public as well as from the mass media.

Considerable debate has raged relating to compensation payable for damage to the
environment. The fact that the environment is not tangible is partly responsible for
this debate. To many minds, the notion of the environment remains abstract. Worse
still, no market value can be attributable to the environment. The difficulties that
surround the quantification of damage to the environment and consequently the
threshold of payable compensation leaves much to be desired. The elaboration of
uniform rules needed for the quantification of damage to the marine environment
will not be a bad idea. Here again the existence of uniform rules may not solve the
problem, given that, oil spills at different places will have different effects on
different marine ecosystems.
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It is clear from the provisions of the convention, and from the practices of the Fund
that not all types of claims will satisfy the requirement of recoverability. The
implication of this is that, not all victims of an oil pollution damage will be in the
position to benefit from the regimes. As such, it will not be surprising that questions
are raised to that effect. To contend that all claims are recoverable under the
convention, will be tantamount to opening the floodgates of litigation. If this were to
be allowed, then corresponding increments of the contributions to the Fund should
be envisaged. This depends to a large extent on the political will of the member
states to the convention. The issue to ascertain here, is to what degree are
governments, members of the regime willing to place a heavier economic burden on
their oil industries.

There is a possibility that the limitation thresholds instituted by the convention may
not meet the claims of certain victims especially where there is a catastrophic spill.
This has created apprehension within the ranks of CLC/FUND member states. To
show that this could pose a threat to the credibility of the regime, IMO, following a
proposal made by the UK is considering a revision of the limitation thresholds. The
burden on the oil companies will be further increased. The oil and shipping
industries have contributed their quota. Maybe the establishment of a third tier
compensation scheme, funded by contributions from environmental conscious
groups, with the dual purpose of providing compensation to oil pollution damage
victims, and the restoration of damaged environment could be worth considering.

From the preceding discussion, one thing stands out clear. All the different parties
and interests involved in the liability and compensation regimes are not completely
satisfied. On the one hand, the victims of oil pollution damage are sometimes not
fully compensated, especially when their claims are made after a major spill. The
case of the Braer speaks for itself, at least as far as the 1969/71 regime is concerned.
The question that the international community has to answer is where does the
regime go from here?
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The answer to this question cannot be found in developing either unilateral
municipal legislation, or multilateral regional legislation. Only unified global action
can effectively redress this situation. If the international regime has come this far, it
is because its merits outweigh its demerits. The community of states has been
responsible for its success from its inception. It will not be too demanding to
assume that responsibility for the sake of future generations. The choice of
protecting the marine environment from oil pollution damage is a worthy cause. It
represents mankind’s response to the higher command. For these reasons, the
efforts should continue.
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